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I. INTRODUCTION
"Of all the wars the United States has fought since 1945, not one has
enjoyed the popularity of the War on Drugs."' Reportedly, Americans fear the
spread of illegal drugs more than unemployment or the deficit.2 Consequently,
Americans indicate a willingness to pay higher taxes for drug enforcement at a
time when there are few other governmental services for which the same
sentiment is expressed.3 Since 1980, there has been an overwhelming increase
in the enforcement of drug laws. 4 The total federal drug budget has increased
eleven-fold. 5 Drug arrests have become the "biggest prison filler in the land." 6
As drug cases flood the federal courts, the punishments meted out continue
to escalate. Federal judges no longer have much discretion in sentencing; "even
the most small-potatoes marijuana crime-possession without intent to sell-
carries a mandatory minimum." 7 Federal parole no longer exists. 8 When you
are convicted under federal law, you are virtually guaranteed to remain in
prison until the full mandatory sentence is served. 9
The federal laws, however, are not unique in their harshness. Many states
have tough drug laws which carry mandatory minimum standards.' 0 For
example, "Michigan's mandatory minimum statute, known as the '650 Lifer'
law, is one of tie oldest and still the toughest in the nation."' As the Supreme
Court noted:
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.7403(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1990-1991) provides a
mandatory sentence of life in prison for possession of 650 grams or more of





7 Id. at 887.
8 Id.
9Id.
10 See infra note 246 and accompanying text.
11 Mike Sager, The Case of Gary Fannon, ROLLING STONE MAGAZINE, Sept. 3, 1992,
at 27, 30.
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"any mixture containing [a schedule 2] controlled substance";
§ 333.7214(a)(iv) defines cocaine as a schedule 2 controlled substance. Section
791.234(4) provides eligibility for parole after 10 years in prison, except for
those convicted of either first-degree murder or "a major controlled substance
offense"; § 791.233b[1](b) defines "major controlled substance offense" as,
inter alia, a violation of § 333.7403.12
Over 160 individuals have been convicted and sentenced to life in prison with
no possibility of parole under this Michigan law, resulting in appeals
challenging the constitutionality of the law. 13 One such appeal was heard by the
United States Supreme Court in Harmelin v. Michigan.14
Ronald Harmelin was stopped by the police for a traffic violation.15 During
the stop, the officer decided to conduct a pat-down search of Harmelin who
revealed that he was carrying a concealed weapon by permit and appeared to be
nervous. 16 In doing so, some marijuana was found and Harmelin was placed
under arrest. 17 A further search of Harmelin yielded assorted pills and
capsules, three vials and ten "baggies" of white powder, drug paraphernalia,
and a telephone-beeper. 18 In a later search of Harmelin's impounded car, the
police discovered a satchel containing a shaving-kit bag in the trunk which
contained $2900 in cash and two bags of white powder subsequently
determined to be 672.5 grams of cocaine. 19 A fingerprint expert testified that
Harmelin's fingerprints were found on books located inside the satchel and next
to the bags of cocaine. 20
After a bench trial, Harmelin was convicted of possession of 650 or more
grams of a mixture containing cocaine, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony. He was sentenced on April 30, 1987 to a mandatory
life term of imprisonment for the cocaine conviction and a mandatory two-year
term of imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. Harmelin appealed the
sentence, but it was affirmed by the Michigan Court of Appeals.2 1 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 22
In his appeal to the Supreme Court, Harmelin claimed that his cocaine
conviction sentence violated the Eighth Amendment for two reasons: first,
12 Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2684 n.1 (1991).
13 Sager, supra note 11, at 30.
14 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).




19 Id. at 78.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 76-77.
22 Harmelin v. Michigan, 495 U.S. 956 (1990).
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because it was "significantly disproportionate" to the crime he committed; 23
second, because the sentencing judge was statutorily required to impose it,
without taking into account the circumstances of the crime or the characteristics
of the criminal. 24
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the sentence in a five-to-four
decision that is illustrative of the continuing debate over whether the Eighth
Amendment encompasses a proportionality guarantee when applied to the
length of a prison sentence. This Comment questions the Court's holding that
the "imposition of a mandatory sentence of life in prison without possibility of
parole for drug possession, without consideration of mitigating factors such as
the fact that [Harmelin] had no prior felony conviction, did not constitute cruel
and unusual punishment" 25 under the Eighth Amendment. Part II will briefly
examine the traditional interpretation of the Eighth Amendment in criminal
law. Part M will discuss the case history of proportionality as a constitutional
doctrine, notably its inconsistent treatment in prior Supreme Court decisions.
Part IV will examine the Harmelin v. Michigan decision and the specific
analysis provided by the various Justices. Part V will analyze the decision
using the analytical approach set forth in Solem v. Helm.26 Part VI will review
the important factors that the Supreme Court failed to consider in deciding
Harmelin. Finally, Part VII will discuss the lower federal courts' application of
proportionality review before and after Harmelin, the Michigan Supreme
Court's subsequent decision declaring the same statute unconstitutional under
its state constitution, and the overall future of proportionality review as it
applies to the length of prison sentences.
II. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
The Eighth Amendment27 ban on "cruel and unusual punishments" has
been traced back to the popular outrage against abuses attributed to the
infamous Lord Chief Justice Jeffreys of the King's Bench during the Stuart
reign of James 11.28 The English Declaration of Rights provision was prompted
23 Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2684 (1991).
24 Id.
25 Id. at 2680.
26 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
27 "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII. The "cruel and unusual"
punishments clause has been applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
28 Note, What is Cel and Unusual Punishment, 24 HARV. L. REV. 54, 55 (1910);
see, e.g., 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARiES 372; L. SCHWOERER, DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS, 1689, at 92-93 (1981); SouRc's OF OUR LIBERTIES 222-23 (R. Perry & J. Cooper
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by the proceedings known as the "Bloody Assizes" following the Duke of
Monmouth's abortive rebellion in 1685.29 The vicious punishments for treason
decreed in the Bloody Assizes (drawing and quartering, burning of women
felons, beheading, and disemboweling among other punishments.) that were
"common" in that period and specifically authorized by law3 have led legal
scholars to conclude that the Eighth Amendment was included only to outlaw
certain "modes" of punishment deemed to be "cruel and unusual." 31
Not all commentators view the focus on modes of punishment as a limit on
the scope of the Eighth Amendment. On the contrary, this narrow
interpretation is not the prevailing interpretation expounded in Supreme Court
precedent. A review of Supreme Court decisions finds the Eighth Amendment
applied more broadly to limit application of the death penalty and to enforce
basic human rights. 32 Its application to proportionality in the length of criminal
sentences will be discussed in Part III. This Part will briefly discuss the other
aforementioned contexts in which the Eighth Amendment has been applied.
In 1972, the Supreme Court expanded its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
when it decided three cases consolidated on appeal as Furman v. Georgia.33
The decision in Furman effectively struck down all death penalty statutes.
Three justices concluded that the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty
constituted "cruel and unusual punishment" in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. 34 Justice White noted that there was "no meaningful basis for
distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty was] imposed from the
many cases in which it [was] not." 35 However, the Supreme Court later
eds., 1959); see also 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CoNsTrruTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1896 (1833).
29 See supra note 28.
30 See BLACKSTONE, supra note 28, at 70; Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REv. 839, 855-56
(1969).
31 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2691 (1991). In Part I(C) of Justice
Scalia's opinion in which he is joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia asserts that
the Eighth Amendment has this narrow interpretation. 1d. at 2691 (citing Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 378 (1989)). "[IThe Clause disables the Legislature from
authorizing particular forms or 'modes' of punishment-specifically, cruel methods of
punishment that are not regularly or customarily employed." Id. at 2691-92 (citations
omitted).
32 See infra notes 33-49, 76-164 and accompanying text.
33 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (5-4 decision).
34 Id. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring); Id. at 310 (Stewart, I., concurring); Id. at 313
(White, J., concurring). Justices Brennan and Marshall also voted to reverse the sentences
because they viewed the death penalty as per se unconstitutional in today's world. Id. at
257-306 (Brennan, J., concurring); Id. at 314-74 (Marshall, J., concurring).
35 Id. at 313 (White, 1., concurring).
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affirmed three death sentences in Gregg v. Georgia,36 Jurek v. Texas, 37 and
Proffitt v. Florida.38 In these decisions the Court established the basic
requirements of: "(1) a bifurcated proceeding where the penalty was considered
separately from the guilt of the defendant; (2) specific standards that narrowed
the class of death-eligible defendants; (3) the consideration of all relevant
information, especially mitigating circumstances, in the penalty phase; and (4)
meaningful appellate review." 39 All of which provide the foundation for
current death penalty schemes and the doctrine of "individualized capital-
sentencing." The Court has held that a "capital sentence is cruel and unusual
under the Eighth Amendment if it is imposed without an individualized
determination that punishment is 'appropriate'-whether or not the sentence is
'grossly disproportionate.'" 40 Individualized sentencing is a key concept in
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, and Harmelin argued in his appeal that it
should be extended beyond the death penalty context. Part IV will address the
Court's rejection of this position.
The Eighth Amendment proportionality principle has also been applied to
limit application of the death penalty when the sentence was deemed to be
"grossly disproportionate" to the crime committed. In Coker v. Georgia,41 the
Supreme Court held that "a sentence of death is grossly disproportionate and
excessive punishment for the crime of rape and is therefore forbidden by the
Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment." 42 The Court applied
similar reasoning in Enmund v. Florida43 to strike down a capital sentence
imposed for a felony murder conviction. The defendant, who was an
accomplice to the felony which resulted in a death, did "not himself kill,
attempt to kill, or intend that killing take place .... ,,44 As some commentators
36 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
37 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
38 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
39 Linda E. Carter, A Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Standard in Death Penalty
Proceedings: A Neglected Element of Fairness, 52 OHIO ST. L.J 195, 197 (1991) (footnotes
omitted).
40 Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2701 (1991) (citing Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)); see also Sumner v. Scuman, 483 U.S. 66, 73 (1987)
(creating the "individualized capital-sentencing doctrine"); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S.
393 (1987); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
(1978).
41 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
42 1d. at 592.
43 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (5-4 decision).
44 Id. at 797; cf Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987) (upholding the defendant's
death penalty conviction, though only an accomplice to the murders, because of his
significant participation in the planning and execution of the crimes).
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have noted, the "twin themes of human dignity and judicial role weave
throughout this line of cases." 45
The standards-of-decency approach is firmly entrenched in our
constitutional theory and most recently, the Eighth Amendment has been
applied outside the capital sentence context to prisoners' rights cases. In
Hudson v. McMillian,46 the Supreme Court extended the Eighth Amendment's
protection against cruel and unusual punishment to cover a prisoner who was
beaten by guards but suffered no "significant injury." 47 And in McCarthy v.
Madigan,48 the Court held that a prisoner need not exhaust administrative
appeals before bringing a federal suit claiming that prison officials violated his
Eighth Amendment rights by neglecting his medical and psychiatric needs. 49
The foregoing examples highlight the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment. The Court has utilized proportionality review to prohibit
the imposition of the death penalty arbitrarily, that is, without specific statutory
guidelines. It has utilized proportionality review to limit the application of the
death penalty and has prohibited the imposition of a death sentence for certain
crimes. It has also utilized the Eighth Amendment's underlying notion of
human decency to enforce the constitutional rights of prisoners. This Part by no
means provides an exhaustive examination of the interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment. For the purposes of this Comment, however, it provides the
necessary background to analyze the Harmelin decision, which focuses on
another aspect of significance in criminal law-the Supreme Court's application
of the Eighth Amendment proportionality principle to non-capital sentences.
45 Thomas E. Baker & Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr., Eighth Amendment Challenges to the
Length of a Criminal Sentence: Following the Supreme Court "From Precedent to
Precedent," 27 ARiz. L. REv. 25, 32 (1985).
46 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992).
47 Id. at 997. The Louisiana prisoner was beaten, while handcuffed and shackled, by
two guards at Angola State Penitentiary while a supervisor watched the beating and
cautioned the two guards "not to have too much fun." Id. Although, according to the Court,
the prisoner had no "significant injury," suffering only bruises, facial swelling, loosened
teeth and cracked dental plate, Justice O'Connor stated that "[w]hen prison officials
maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency
always are violated." Id. at 1000. She added, "[tihis is true whether or not significant injury
is evident." Id.
48 112 S. Ct. 1081 (1992).
49 Id. at 1088.
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III. CHALLENGES TO THE LENGTH OF CRIMINAL SENTENCES
A. Historical Background
The requirement that punishment be proportional to the seriousness of the
offense has traditionally been a salient principle of punishment.50 The principle
of proportionality was familiar to English law at the time the Declaration of
Rights5' was drafted.52 The Magna Charta53 provided that "[a] free man shall
not be fined for a small offence, except in proportion to the measure of the
offence; and for a great offence he shall be fined in proportion to the magnitude
of the offence, saving his freehold .... 54 Even today, proportionality is
manifested explicitly in the statement of purpose of various criminal codes.55
The Model Penal Code includes among the purposes of the definition of crimes
the aim "to differentiate on reasonable grounds between serious and minor
offenses," 56 and it includes among the purposes of sentencing provisions the
aim "to safeguard offenders against excessive, disproportionate or arbitrary
punishment. "57 In simple and concise terms, the proportionality doctrine
prohibits punishment more severe than that deserved by the criminal for the
50 See Baker & Baldwin, supra note 45. "The requirement that the punishment be
proportionate to the crime may be traced backward to the Magna Charta in 1215 and
forward through the English common law, the English Bill of Rights in 1689, and beyond."
Id. at 27; see also Hodges v. Humkin, 80 Eng. Rep. 1015, 1016 (K.B. 1615) (Croke, J.)
("[I]mprisonment ought always to be according to the quality of the offence.").
51 The Declaration of Rights is the antecedent of the United States Constitutional text.
This document was promulgated in February 1689, and was enacted into law as the Bill of
Rights. 1 Win. & Mary, Sess. 2, ch. 2, in December 1689; See S-.VOERER, supra note
28, at 279, 295-98 (1981); SouRcEs OF OuR LIBERTIES 222-23 (R. Perry & J. Cooper eds.;
1959).
52 See Baker & Baldwin, supra note 45, at 35.
53 "The great charter. The name of a charter (or constitutional enactment) granted by
King John of England to the barons, at Runnymede, on June 15, 1215, and afterwards, with
some alterations, confirmed in Parliament by Henry Il and Edward I. This charter is justly
regarded as the foundation of English constitutional liberty." BLAcK's LAW DI-rioNARY
951-52 (6th ed. 1990).
54 The Magna Charta, Art. 20, reprinted in SouRCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 222-23 (R.
Perry & J. Cooper eds., 1959).
55 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170 (West Supp. 1993) (noting that punishment
through imprisonment is "best served by terms proportionate to the seriousness of the
offense with provision for uniformity in the sentences of offenders committing the same
offense under similar circumstances"); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05 (McKinney 1987) ("To
differentiate on reasonable grounds between serious and minor offenses and to prescribe
proportionate penalties therefor.").
56 Model Penal Code § 1.02(1)(e) (1962).
57 Id. at § 102(2)(c).
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harm caused and the moral blameworthiness exhibited. The criminal laws make
clear that nonviolent crimes are less serious than crimes marked by violence or
the threat of violence.58 Commentators agree that "when the question of the
quantum of punishment for such [criminal] conduct is raised, we should defer
to principles which make relative moral wickedness of different offenders a
partial determinant of the severity of punishment." 59 This basic notion of an
individual determination of the degree of guilt will be important when
considering the issue of the appropriateness of mandatory sentencing, which
does not require any individual determinations concerning the defendant's prior
history and propensity toward criminal activity to determine the sentence to be
imposed.
B. Theories of Punishment
Although a lengthy discussion of the justification of punishment is beyond
the scope of this Comment, it is worth mentioning that the theories of
punishment also contribute to the framing of sentencing structures. Some
theories are concerned with the particular offender, while others focus more on
the nature of the offense and the welfare of the general public. For example, if
the goal is deterrence, it is believed "the punishment should be adjusted in such
a manner to each particular offence," that potential offenders are deterred from
committing the act.60 In addition, some sentences are framed under one theory,
while others may be justified under several. The most widely accepted theories
of punishment are retribution, deterrence, prevention, restraint, rehabilitation,
and education.
Retribution is the oldest theory of punishment. It has gained wide
acceptance and commands considerable respect from the general public. 61
Under this theory "punishment (the infliction of suffering) is imposed by
society on criminals in order to obtain revenge because it is only fitting and just
that one who has caused harm to others should himself suffer for it. "62
Alternatively, some retribution theorists believe that the offender should
"receive commensurate punishment in order to restore the peace of mind and
58 See Peter H. Rossi et al., The Seriousness of Crimes: Normative Structure and
Individual Differences, 39 AM. Soc. REv. 224, 237 (1974).
59 H.L.A. HART, LAW, LmERTY AND MoRALry 37 (1963).
60 JEREMY BENTHAM, Principles of Penal Law pt. II, bk. I, ch. VI, in 1 J. BENTHAM'S
WORKS 401 (J. Bowring ed.; 1843).
61 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusTIN W. ScoTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 1.5, at 26 (2d ed.
1986). "Retribution was long the theory least accepted by theorists, it 'is suddenly being
seen by thinkers of all political persuasions as perhaps the strongest ground, after all, upon
which to base a system of punishment.'" Id. (quoting Martin Gardner, The Renaissance of
Retribution-An Examination of Doing Justice, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 781, 784).62 Id. § 1.5, at 25-26.
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repress the criminal tendencies of others" 63 and that "retributive punishment is
needed to maintain respect for the law and to suppress acts of private
vengeance." 64
Under the deterrence theory, the threat of punishment (actually carried out
against specific offenders for the crimes they have committed) is supposed to
deter potential offenders in the general community from committing future
crimes. 65 Deterrence is sometimes referred to as general prevention or general
deterrence. 66 The extent to which criminal punishment actually has a deterrent
effect on the general public has not been substantiated by any conclusive
empirical research. 67 The education theory also focuses more on the effect on
63 Id. § 1.5, at 26 (citing I. GIBS, CRIME, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 82-83
(1975) Note, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1249, 1257-59 (1978)). See D.J. Galligan, The Return to
Retribution in Penal Theory, CRIME, PROOF AND PUNISHMENT 144-71 (C.F.H. Tapper ed.,
1981) (asserting retribution theory's resurgence of popularity); Steinberger, Hegel on Crime
and Punishment, 77 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 858 (1983) (noting retributive justifications of
punishment). For critical studies of retribution, see A.C. EWING, THE MORALITY OF
PUNISHMENT (1929) and NIGEL WALKER, PUNISHMENT, DANGER AND STIGMA: THE
MORALITY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1980). See generally CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT:
VIEWS, EXPLANATIONS AND JUSTIFICATIONS (Rudolph J. Gerber & Patrick D. McAnany
eds., 1972) [hereinafter CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT]; A. GOODHART, ENGLISH LAW AND
THE MORAL LAW 92-93 (1953).
64 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 61, § 1.5, at 25.
65 See FRANKLIN ZIMRING, PERSPECrvES ON DETERRENCE 32-97 (1971). The theory
of simple deterrence is that threats can reduce crime because people who are tempted to
pursue particular criminal conduct will refrain from committing the offense because the risk
of an unpleasant result, i.e., the communicated threat of punishment, offsets the pleasure
that might be obtained from going through with the criminal act. See also CONTEMPORARY
PUNISHMENT, supra note 63, at 93 ("Only when the threat has failed in a particular case do
we apply punishment. When we do so, we say that in order to keep the threat credible we
must punish those who break the law.").
66 Deterrence theorists distinguish between the effect of punishment as a general
deterrent from it as a special deterrent-that is, the infliction of punishment on convicted
defendants leaves them less likely to engage in the crime. See J. ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT
AND DETERRENCE 175 (1974); David Nagin, General Deterrence: A Review of the
Empirical Evidence, in DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 95 (A. Blumstein, J. Cohen & D. Nagin eds.,
1978). This theory is asserted by the Michigan Legislature and the Respondent in Harmlin
as justifying the harsh mandatory sentence. Thus, the legislature and the Supreme Court
rely on a theory which is not supported by any actual conclusive empirical research as to its
effectiveness. Therefore, it is more likely that the sentence serves as merely a form of
retribution.
67 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 61, § 1.5, at 25. It is difficult to assess the
effectiveness of fear of punishment as a deterrent because it is but one of several forces that
restrain people from violating the law. Attacks on deterrence theories have concentrated on
the empirical claim, without evidentiary support, that criminals and would-be criminals are
dissuaded from crime by their assessment of the risks of conviction and the unpleasantness
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the general public. Criminal punishment is supposed to educate the public to
distinguish between good and bad conduct, by the publicity surrounding the
trial, conviction, and punishment of criminals. 68
The prevention theory, also called intimidation, aims to deter the criminal
from committing future crimes. Punishment is supposed to serve as an
unpleasant experience that the criminal will not want to endure again. The
validity of this theory is sometimes questioned due to the high recidivism rates
of those who have been punished. 69
Restraint, also expressed as incapacitation, has received increased attention
in recent years as a crime control strategy. 70 "The notion here.., is that
society may protect itself from persons deemed to be dangerous because of
their past criminal conduct by isolating these persons from society." 71 The
theory, however, depends on selective identification of those criminals who
present a danger of continuing criminality, and critics question whether this
identification can be accurately accomplished. 72
There is, lastly, rehabilitation, also called correction or reformation.
Rehabilitation is aimed at giving the criminal "appropriate treatment, in order
to rehabilitate him and return him to society so reformed that he will not desire
or need to commit further crimes." 73 Unfortunately, not many postconviction
actions toward offenders or prison environments are truly rehabilitative. 74
Because no satisfactory results have been shown in practice, some have
of imprisonment. Individuals react differently to the threat of punishment depending on
various factors including "social class, age, intelligence and moral training." Id. "The
magnitude of the threatened punishment is clearly a factor, but perhaps not as important a
consideration as the probablity of discovery and punishment." Id. (emphasis added).
Deterrence theories may not have been given a fair chance because reaction to past failures
has been to increase penalties rather than increasing the certainty of punishment. Id. at 25
n.31. See ANDENAES, supra note 66, at 9 (stating that due to the lack of a measurement of
its effectiveness, there is disagreement over the importance of general prevention); PHILIP
BEAN, PUNISHMENT 29-44 (1981); see also ZIMRNG, supra note 65; Nagin, supra note 66,
at 95-139 (assessing research on deterrence).
68 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 61, § 1.5, at 25.
69 See id. § 1.5, at 23.
70 See Jacqueline Cohen, Incapacitation as a Strategy for Crime Control: Possibilities
and Pioals, in CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REvIEw oF RESEARCH, vol. 5, pp. 1-84
(M. Tomy and N. Morris eds., 1983).
71 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 61, § 1.5, at 24.
72 Id., see also Cohen, supra note 70.
73 LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 61, § 1.5, at 24.
741d. § 1.5, at 24 nn.21-23.
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questioned the theory's reliability and in recent years its influence has
declined. 75
Legislatures usually include as an objective one of these theories in order
to justify a particular sentence as punishment for a specific offense and courts,
therefore, consider these theories when deciding the proportionality issue.
Legislators and individuals in general have shown the greatest disposition to err
on the excessive side in meting out punishment to achieve these objectives.
Thus, there is a great need for precautions against disproportionate sentencing.
C. United States Supreme Court Precedent
The Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment forbids grossly
disproportionate sentencing, but has been cautious in applying the principle. As
with many other constitutional principles, the Court has had some difficulty,
and gone through some transition, in developing an analytical approach to
proportionality cases. Thus, a background history emphasizing the leading
Supreme Court decisions on proportionality begins this inquiry.
1. Early Cases
In 1910, the Supreme Court for the first time overturned a criminal
sentence applying the Eighth Amendment proportionality principle. In Weems
v. United States,76 the defendant was convicted of falsifying a public document
and was sentenced to fifteen years of cadena temporal ("temporary chain"), a
punishment remnant of the Spanish Civil Code that included imprisonment,
75 See FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLI E OF THE REHABILrrATIVE IDEAL-PENAL
POLICY AND SOCIAL POLICY (1981); see also MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAw AND PSYCHIATRY
234-35 (1984).
76 217 U.S. 349 (1910). The Court interpreted the cruel and unusual punishment
clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights. PHIL. CONST. ART. III § 1(19). The clause came
verbatim from the Eighth Amendment and Congress intended the same meaning. 217 U.S.
at 367. Thus the analysis was the same as under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289 (1983). Weems, however, was not the first Supreme
Court case to discuss the proportionality doctrine. The doctrine may be traced back to
Justice Field's 1892 dissenting opinion in O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1892)
(Field, J., dissenting). The defendant in O'Neil, a legitimate New York dealer, was
convicted of 307 separate counts of mail-order sales of liquor in Vermont, a dry state. His
cumulative fine plus costs was $6,638.72 and he was committed until payment; a failure to
meet a payment deadline would result in a 19,914 day (55 years) sentence to hard labor. Id.
at 323-24. The majority dismissed the writ for want of jurisdiction and because the Eighth
Amendment did not apply to the states. Id. at 331-32. In his dissenting opinion, Justice
Field, along with Justices Harlan and Brewer concluded that the Eighth Amendment was
violated by such "punishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly
disproportioned to the offences charged." Id. at 339-40 (Field, J., dissenting).
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hard and painful labor, shackling at the ankle and wrist, and the permanent loss
of basic civil rights.77 The Court admitted that neither legislative history, stare
decisis, nor commentary shed much light on the central meaning of the Eighth
Amendment. The majority declared, however, "it is a precept of justice that
punishment for crime should be graduated and proportionate to the offense." 78
Justice McKenna, writing for the majority, thus, invoked the accepted principle
that the Constitution must be read in light of contemporary social needs as well
as the Framers' intent.79 The Court committed to a course of broad
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment based on objective measures going
beyond general sensibilities to include comparisons with punishments of similar
crimes in other jurisdictions and comparisons with punishments for more
serious crimes within the same jurisdiction.80 Nowhere in the opinion did the
Court qualify this bold statement of principle. Applying the comparative law
analysis (that was later adopted by a majority of the Supreme Court in Solem v.
Helm8 l), the Court held that the defendant's sentence was "cruel in its excess
of imprisonment ... [and] unusual in its character. Its punishments come
under the condemnation of the Bill of Rights, both on account of their degree
and kind."8 2
The Weems decision represents a basic constitutional principle-the
legislature has the power to determine crimes and punishments, but that power
is not absolute.8 3 The power of judicial review creates an affirmative role for
the Court. While the "function of the legislature is primary," constitutional
limits exist, "and what those are the judiciary must judge. "84
77 217 U.S. at 364, 366.
78 Id. at 367.
7 9 Id. at 373.
Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a
principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it
birth. This [sic] is peculiarly true of constitutions. ... They are, to use the words of
Chief Justice Marshall, "designed to approach immortality as nearly human institutions
can approach it."
Id. See also id. at 385-86 (White, J., dissenting).
80 Id. at 375-81.
81 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
82 Wee=s, 217 U.S. at 377.
83 See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 355-61 (1983) (holding void for vagueness
a California criminal statute that required persons who loiter or wander on the streets to
provide "credible and reliable" identification); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405
U.S. 156, 161-71 (1972) (declaring vagrancy statute unconstitutionally vague); Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
84 Weemr, 217 U.S. at 379.
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Although its answer in Weems was an unequivocal assertion of power,
these principles were not exercised for almost fifty years. 85 In two Supreme
Court decisions during that period, the Court rejected arguments based upon
the Eighth Amendment challenging criminal sentences. 86 Finally in 1958, Chief
Justice Warren in Trop v. Dulles87 declared that the "basic concept underlying
the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man." 88 Citing
Weems, the Court recognized "that the words of the Amendment are not
precise, and that their scope is not static." 89 Thus, Warren concluded, "the
85 See Baker & Baldwin, supra note 45, at 31 n.38. The authors offer two possible
explanations for the fifty-year hiatus between Weems and its modem progeny: (1) before
incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment, there were fewer opportunities for applying
Eighth Amendment principles; (2) federal courts seem to confuse the constitutional issue
with the nonconstitutional issue of appellate review of sentences.
The great majority of appeals against the length of an imposed sentence do not reach
the constitutional threshold and merely amount to a request for an appellate review of
the trial court's discretion. Such an authority in appellate courts, to reduce sentences
within the statutory limits, is itself a creature of statute.
Id. at 26 n.4 (citing Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958)). See generally James D.
Hopkins, Reviewing Sentencing Discretion: A Method of Swift Appellate Action, 23 UCLA
L. REV. 491 (1976)). Justice White's powerful dissent in Weems and ambiguities in the
majority opinion may explain also the lack of enthusiasm by lower federal courts. Baker &
Baldwin, supra note 45, at 31 n.38 (citing Richard C. Turkington, Unconstitutionally
Excessive Punishments: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment and the Weems Ptinciple,
3 C~iu. L. BULL. 145, 149-50 (1967)).
86 Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912). The Court upheld a state
recidivism statute which imposed a mandatory life sentence on a "thrice-convicted" felon.
See generally Joshua Dressier, Substantive Criminal Law Through the Looking Glass of
Rummel v. Estelle: Proportionality and Justice as Endangered Doctrines, 34 Sw. L.J. 1063
(1981). The cryptic one sentence in the unanimous opinion rejecting the Eighth Amendment
claim must be attributed to the refusal, as of 1912, to incorporate that guarantee into
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process. Id. at 1093; Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391
(1916). Badders involved a federal sentence of five years concurrent and $7000 cumulative
fine for seven counts of mail fraud. Id. at 393. The one line rejection of the Eighth
Amendment claim simply suggests that the Court did not find that sentence cruel and
unusual. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 290 n.7 (1980).
87 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
88 Id. at 100. The plurality held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited
denationalization for a soldier's crime of being absent without leave one day. Id. at 87.
Chief Justice Warren authored an opinion joined by Justices Black, Douglas, and Whittaker.
Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Brennan also
concurred, but separately. Justice Frankfurter dissented, joined by Justices Burton, Clark
and Harlan. Id.
89 Id. at 100-01.
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Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society." 90 Four years later, a majority
applied the principle to invalidate a criminal sentence in Robinson v.
California.91 The defendant in Robinson was given a ninety-day sentence for
being addicted to the use of narcotics. 92 Acknowledging that such a punishment
considered in the abstract was neither cruel nor unusual, the Court appealed to
"contemporary human knowledge" to declare that any imprisonment would be
disproportionate to the offense of addiction, placing that status beyond the
legislative criminalization power.93 Justice Stewart's opinion emphasized the
limited role of the Supreme Court to restrict the legislatures' powers to
criminalize certain conduct. 94 In this case, however, the legislature had gone
beyond the constitutional limit.95
The trio of Supreme Court cases that followed, Rummel v. Estelle,96 Hutto
v. Davis,97 and Solem v. Helm,98 yield seemingly inconsistent holdings on
proportionality review. The decisions represent the struggle within the Court to
clarify the parameters of what has been a difficult issue for the Court and an
important issue in both criminal and constitutional law.
2. Rummel v. Estelle
Rummel v. Estelle99 was the first in the trio of Supreme Court cases
concerning proportionality. William Rummel was convicted in 1964 of
90 Id. at 100. See Beth D. Liss, Note, 77e Eighth Amendment: Judicial Self-Restraint
and Legislative Power, 65 MARQ. L. REv. 434, 442-43 (1982).
91 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
92 Id.
93 Id. at 666, 667.
94 Id. at 664-65.
95 Commentators have proposed a narrower interpretation of Robinson, contending
that an illness, like addiction, may not be criminalized regardless of the proportionality of
the punishment. Martin R. Gardner, The Determinate Sentencing Movement and the Eighth
Amendment. Excessive Punishment Before and After Rummel v. Estelle, 1980 DUKE L.L
1103, 1115 n.89; William H. Mulligan, Cruel and Unusual Punishments: The
Proportionality Rule, 47 FORDHAM L. RnV. 639, 644 (1979); Herbert L. Packer, Comment,
Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HARv. L. Rav. 1071, 1071 (1964); see also
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983) (citing Robinson for the proposition that "a
single day in prison may be unconstitutional in some circumstances."); Margret J. Radin,
The Jurisprudence of Death: Evolving Standards for the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause, 126 U. PA. L. Rv. 989, 994 (1978) (asserting that any punishment was
disproportionate to the crime of addiction).
96 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
97 454 U.S. 370 (1982).
98 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
99 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
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fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain $80 worth of goods; he was convicted
in 1969 of passing a forged check for $28.36; and finally, in 1973, he was
convicted of obtaining money ($120.75) by false pretenses. 1°° All three
nonviolent property offenses were classified as felonies under Texas law. 01
Rummel was prosecuted for his third or "trigger" offense under the Texas
recidivist statute.102 Under the statute, a third felony conviction after conviction
and imprisonment for two prior felonies would result in a mandatory life
sentence. Pursuant to the statute, the state trial judge imposed the obligatory
life sentence.10 3
After unsuccessful appeals in the state appellate court and lower federal
courts,104 Rummel was denied relief by the Supreme Court as well. In a five-
to-four decision, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, held that a
state could constitutionally impose a sentence of life imprisonment for these
three sequential nonviolent felonies. 105
The Court did so by understating and distinguishing the precedent that had
conceded a principle of proportionality, stressing that recent applications had
been limited to the death penalty because of its uniqueness in its finality and
100 Id. at 264-66.
101 Id. at 266.
102 Id.; see also Baker & Baldwin, supra note 45, at 33 n.54. The Court did not
expressly consider Rummel's complete record but was made aware of it. Rummel had been
convicted of at least twelve separate crimes between 1959 and 1973, some of which were
rather serious as, for example, possession of a deadly weapon, burglary, and aggravated
assault. Rwmel, 445 U.S. at 266.
103 Rwnmel, 445 U.S. at 266.
104 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Rummel's conviction. Rummel v.
State, 509 S.W.2d 630 (Trex. Crim. App. 1974). He then filed an unsuccessful petition
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Texas claiming, inter alia, that his sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate. A
divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district
court's denial of relief. Rummel v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1978). On rehearing,
the court, sitting en bane, rejected the panel's ruling and affirmed the district court's denial
of the petition. Rummel v. Estelle, 587 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), aft'd, 445 U.S.
263 (1980).
105 445 U.S. at 285. The Court focused on the state's interest in punishing a recidivist.
The Court noted that under Texas law a recidivist must be twice convicted of a felony and
actually serve a prison sentence, demonstrating that this does not deter him from returning
to crime once he is released. Rummel had been graphically informed of the consequences of
repeated criminal conduct and given an opportunity to reform, all to no avail. "[The Texas
statute] thus is nothing more than a societal decision that when such a person commits yet
another felony, he should be subjected to the admittedly serious penalty of incarceration for
life, subject only to the State's judgment as to whether to grant him parole." Id. at 278
(footnote omitted).
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absoluteness.' 0 6 A "bright line" was drawn between the ultimate sanction and
all lesser terms of imprisonment. 10 7 As for Weems, the Court limited that
decision to "its peculiar facts," including the minor nature of the offense, the
lengthy minimum term, and the extraordinary accessory punishments of the
cadena temporal.'08 The Court stated, however, that for crimes classified as
felonies, that is, punishable by significant terms of imprisonment in a state
penitentiary, the length of sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of
legislative prerogative. 10 9 The Court further emphasized the highly subjective
character of the judgment made in marking out constitutional limits on amounts
of punishment and the desirability in a federal system of permitting wide
latitude of judgment to the states. "Once the death penalty and other
punishments different in kind from fine or imprisonment have been put to one
side, there remains little in the way of objective standards for judging ... "l10
Rejecting Justice Powell's dissent which compared Rummel's sentence to that
for other crimes in Texas and the punishment for the same crime in other
states, Justice Rehnquist stated:
Even were we to assume that the statute employed against Rummel was the
most stringent found in the 50 States, that severity hardly would render
Rummel's punishment "grossly disproportionate" to his offenses or to the
punishment he would have received in the other States .... [O]ur Constitution
"is made for people of fundamentally differing view [sic] ...." Arizona
punishes as a felony the theft of any "neat or homed animal," regardless of its
value; California considers the theft of "avocados, citrus or deciduous fruits,
nuts and artichokes" particularly reprehensible. I 1I
The majority was only willing to concede in a footnote that one could imagine
extreme examples when the proportionality principle would come into play."12
The dissent posed a hypothetical in which the legislature makes overtime
parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment.11 3 The majority conceded
that the proportionality principle would come into play in such a situation. 114
106 Id. at 274-75.
107 Id. at 275. Referring to its line of death penalty cases, including Coker v. Georgia,
433 U.S. 584 (1977), the Court stated that it could draw a "bright line" for death penalty
cases but that it is much more difficult to draw a clear line between different lengths of
imprisonment.
08 Rwnmel at 274, 275.
109 Id. at 274.
110 Id. at282 n.27.
111 Id. at 282 (footnotes omitted).
1 12 Id. at 274 n.l1.
113 Id. at 288 (Powell, J., dissenting).
114 Id. at 274 n.ll.
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Justice Powell's dissent merits attention because it produces the test that
would be applied by the majority in Solem v. Helm."15 The dissent's starting
premise, based on legislative history, intent of the framers, and common law,
was that the disproportionality analysis is an inherent aspect of the cruel and
unusual punishments clause. Relying on Weems and other noncapital cases as
well as on the death penalty decisions, the dissent felt a constitutional
obligation to measure "the relationship between the nature and number of
offenses committed and the severity of the punishment inflicted upon the
offender." 116 Justice Powell set forth three objective criteria for reviewing
proportionality challenges to the length of criminal sentences: (1) the nature of
the offense; (2) comparison with sentences imposed in other jurisdictions for
commission of the same crime; and (3) comparison with sentences imposed in
the same jurisdiction for commission of other crimes.117
Applying these criteria to the facts presented, Rummel's challenge drew
favor because of the nonviolent nature of the offense. Next, the dissent found
that Texas punished recidivists dramatically harsher than other jurisdictions.
Finally, within the Texas statutory scheme, Rummel's sentence for three
nonviolent felonies was harsher than what first and second offenders who
committed more serious crimes, such as murder, kidnapping, and rape could
possibly receive. 118 Thus, the dissent concluded that Rummel's sentence
violated the Constitution.' 1 9 To the dissenters, the "[o]bjective indicia of
evolving standards of decency justified the Court's exercise of its historic role,
first recognized in Weems, as final arbiter of the cruel and unusual punishments
clause." 120 This battle to establish the precise contours of the proportionality
principle was fought again one year later in the second precedent in the trio.
3. Hutto v. Davis
In Hutto v. Davis,121 the Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit,
stating that "unless we want anarchy to prevail within the federal judicial
115 Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens joined Justice Powell's dissent. Id. at 285
(Powell, J., dissenting).
116 Id. at 288 (Powell, J., dissenting).
117 Id. at 295.
118 Id. at 295-303.
119 Id. at 302-03.
120 Baker & Baldwin, supra note 45, at 35.
121 454 U.S. 370 (1982). The procedural history of Davis explains the Court's special
effort to reaffirm its holding in Rwnnzl. The District Court for the Western District of
Virginia granted Davis's section 2254 petition, filed before the Supreme Court's decision in
Ruwmel, under previously established Fourth Circuit precedent. Davis v. Zahrdnick, 432 F.
Supp. 444, 451 (W.D. Va. 1977). A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit reversed and upheld the sentence by distinguishing between sentences for life
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system, a precedent of this Court must be followed by the lower federal courts
no matter how misguided the judges of those courts may think it to be." 122
Roger Davis was convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to
distribute; the amount of marijuana involved was approximately nine ounces,
having a street value of about $200. A jury imposed a sentence of $10,000 and
a twenty-year prison term on each conviction, the terms to run consecutively.
The sentences were well within the Virginia statutory maximum of a $25,000
fine and a forty-year prison term. 23
In affirming the sentence, the majority 124 defended the "bright line" drawn
between the death penalty, which differs in kind, and terms of imprisonment,
which differ only in duration.'25 The major premise was that Eighth
Amendment judgments should not be subjective. 126 The minor premise in the
decision was that any determination of excessiveness between two terms of
years would be subjective. The Court, therefore, concluded that challenges
against sentences for terms of years were beyond the constitutional range of the
federal courts. 127 But once again, the Court conceded that the proportionality
principle would come into play in some situations; such as the Rummel
dissenter's overtime parking hypothetical. 128 "Rwmnel stands for the
proposition that federal courts should be 'reluctan[t] to review legislatively
mandated terms of imprisonment,' ... and that 'successful challenges to the
proportionality of particular sentences' should be 'exceedingly rare.'" 129 The
majority's opinion thus conceded some role, albeit limited, for the federal
courts to review the lines drawn by the state legislatures. 130
Justice Powell wrote a concurrence in which he "reluctantly" admitted that
the Rwmmel precedent required reversal. Davis's crimes were more serious and
and sentences for terms of years. Davis v. Davis, 585 F.2d 1226 (4th Cir. 1978). On
rehearing, en banc, the Fourth Circuit vacated the panel opinion and affirmed the district
court's decision to grant relief, adopting the district court's analysis. Davis v. Davis, 601
F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1979) (en bane). The Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari,
vacated the judgment, and remanded for further consideration in light of the after-decided
Riawmnl v. Estelle. Hutto v. Davis, 445 U.S. 947 (1980). An equally-divided en banc
Fourth Circuit then disagreed on the precedential impact of Runwnel and therefore affirmed
the district court's judgment. Davis v. Davis, 646 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1981).
122 Davis, 454 U.S. at 375. The Supreme Court reprimanded the lower court's action
after the first remand.
123 Davis v. Davis, 585 F.2d 1226, 1229 (4th Cir. 1978).
124 The per curiam opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White,
Blackmun, Rehnquist, and O'Connor.
125 454 U.S. at 373-74.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 374 n.3.
129 Id. at 374 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272, 274 (1980)).
130 Id. at 374 n.3.
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his sentence less severe than the sentence upheld in Rwnmel. Hence stare
decisis served as another objective measure in the judicial assessment of
proportionality. 131 Three Justices, however, dissented; 132 critical of the
majority for a "serious and improper expansion of Rummel" which the Justices
read as limited to cases involving the overwhelming state interest to punish
recidivists with severe sentences which otherwise would be disproportionate. 133
The dissent argued that Davis was one of those concededly rare cases in which
the sentence violated the Constitution. 134
4. Solem v. Helm
In the next Term, just three years after Rummel, the Supreme Court
returned to the cruel and unusual punishment issue. In Solem v. Helm, 135
Justice Powell tried to clarify the Court's prior decisions and establish an
analytical framework to be applied in future cases.
Jerry Helm was a thirty-six-year-old alcoholic and bad check artist at the
time of sentencing. Helm had spent much of the previous fifteen years in the
penitentiary. 136 His six previous felonies included: three third-degree burglaries
(1964, 1965, 1969); obtaining money under false pretenses (1972); grand
larceny (1973); and a third offense of driving while intoxicated (1975).137 In
1979, Helm pled guilty to uttering a "no account" check for $100 which
ordinarily carries a maximum punishment of a $5000 fine and five years
imprisonment. 138 Under the South Dakota statutory scheme, however, Helm's
131 Id. at 379-81 (Powell, J., concurring).
132 Id. at 381. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens
dissented.
133 Id. at 382-83. The dominant factor for the dissent was intrajurisdictional disparity.
Id. at 385-86. A letter from the prosecutor labeling Davis's sentence as "grossly unjust,"
because by comparison there was such a "grave disparity in sentencing" between the
sentence and other Virginia sentences in comparable drug offenses. The Virginia
Legislature had later reduced the maximum sentence for the same offenses to less than one-
half of the sentence Davis received. Id.; see also id. at 377-79 (Powell, J., concurring).
134 Id. at 384 (Brennan, I., dissenting). Brennan argued that the general principle of
deference to the legislatures could not justify "the complete abdication of [the Court's]
responsibility to enforce the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 383. Brennan also said that the
Court failed to demonstrate why this was not one of those "exceedingly rare" cases
requiring invalidation of the sentence as disproportionate, violative of the Eighth
Amendment. Instead, the Court reversed the Fourth Circuit which had undertaken that
analysis "upon full review and with the benefit of a substantial record, oral argument, and
briefs." Id. at 384.
135 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
136 Id.
137 Id. at 279-80.
138 Id. at 281.
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record made him eligible for life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole, which is what he received.' 39 After being refused relief in the state
appellate systemt40 and in his 28 U.S.C. section 2254 proceeding in the district
court, Helm succeeded in the Eighth Circuit.141 In a decision written by Justice
Powell, the author of the Rummel dissent and the Davis concurrence, the
Supreme Court affirmed the appellate decision.' 42 Helm represented a dramatic
turn in the course of the Court's recent path.
Justice Powell's analysis began with principles of constitutional text and
history.' 43 He traced the constitutional value of proportionality back to the
original framers' intent and English common law. 144 Justice Powell relied on a
century of Supreme Court precedents. He cited Weems as "the leading case"
and also noted Robinson and the capital punishment line of cases.' 45 Justice
Powell emphasized the need for deference to both the legislature and the trial
courts. First, deference is due to the paramount authority of the legislature in
determining general limits in sentencing. Second, deference should be shown to
the informed discretion of trial courts in sentencing particular offenders.' 46
Such deference necessarily means that successful proportionality challenges will
be rare. However, "no penalty is per se constitutional." 147 The majority
therefore held "as a matter of principle that a criminal sentence must be
proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been convicted."1 48
Powell further stated that when sentences are reviewed under the Eighth
Amendment, courts should be guided by objective factors that have been
"recognized" in previous cases: (1) a comparison of the gravity of the offense
139 Id. at 282. For the complete case history before the Supreme Court consideration
see Robin R. Bennett, Note, Helm v. Solem: A Favorable Decision for Recidivist Facing
Life Sentences Without Parole, 27 ST. Louis U. L.J. 663, 675-79 (1983); Nancy Keir,
Note, Solem v. Helm: Extending Judicial Review Under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishnents Clause to Require "Proportionality" of Prison Sentences, 33 CATH. U. L. REv.
479, 501-03 (1984); Steven Quattlebaum, Note, Helm v. Solem: Can A Prison Sentence
Constitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 36 ARK. L. REV. 673, 682-87 (1983).
140 State v. Helm, 287 N.W.2d 497 (S.D. 1980). Two justices would have reversed
and remanded for resentencing; two justices affirmed the sentence; the justice who cast the
deciding vote concurred with the affirmance based on the state clemancy statutes. Id. at
499.
141 Helm v. Solem, 684 F.2d 582 (8th Cir. 1982). The panel distinguished Runmel
and Davis-proving to be an important aspect of the Supreme Court's proportionality
analysis in its treatment of Helm.
142 Helm, 463 U.S. at 303.
143 Id. at 284-86.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 286-90.
146 Id. at 290 n.16.




and the harshness of the penalty; (2) a comparison with sentences imposed for
other crimes in the same jurisdiction; and (3) a comparison with sentences
imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions. 149 The conceded relativity of
these three criteria does not reduce them to purely subjective measures. Courts
are assumed to be competent to make such broad comparisons of crime,
criminal, and sentence. Evaluating harm and determining culpability are
standard techniques of the judicial art. 150
Applying his test to the facts, Powell concluded that the sentence was
unconstitutional. The trigger crime of uttering a $100 no-account check was
passive, nonviolent, and involved a relatively small amount. 151 The South
Dakota statute carried heavy penalties for recidivism, however, and made
relevant all of Helm's prior offenses, which the Court characterized as
nonviolent, relatively minor, offenses. As for the sentence, life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole was the most severe punishment available in
South Dakota. 152 Thus, the first criteria suggested an imbalance between crime
and punishment.' 53 Second, the Court reviewed the entire legislative scheme of
authorized punishments in the state. Only a few of the more serious crimes
were mandatorily punished by life imprisonment, and for a larger group, life
imprisonment was authorized. 154 Life imprisonment was not authorized at all
for a large group of very serious offenses. 155 Thus, the Court concluded that
Helm's life sentence was equivalent or more severe than sentences that South
Dakota imposed for more serious crimes. 156 Third, the Court considered the
sentence in the national context and concluded that Helm would have received a
less severe punishment in every other state. 157
Justice Powell made a point to distinguish the facts in Rummel from those
in Helm, highlighting the difference in the Texas parole system from the
executive commutation system in South Dakota. 158 Parole is a regular part of
the rehabilitative process, is governed by legal standards, and assuming good
14 91d. at 291-92. Powell's objective factors were espoused in his Rummel dissent, but
can also be traced back to the Weems opinion. See Weems, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
150 Helm, 463 U.S. at 292-95. The opinion provides some illustrations of this analysis.
Widely shared views consider violent crime more serious. A lesser offense should not be
punished more severely than a greater offense. Traditional concepts of mental state and
motive differentiate among offenders. On a case-by-case basis, one sentence of
imprisonment may be distinguished from another.
151 Id. at 297-98.
152 Id. at 297.
153 Id. at 296-97.
15 4 Id. at 298-99.
155 Id. at 299.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 299-300.
158 Id. at 301-03 nn. 31-32.
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behavior, is the normal expectation in the vast majority of cases. 159 On the
other hand, commutation is an ad hoc exercise of executive clemency lacking
articulable standards. 160 The possibility of commutation is nothing more than a
hope in something that is rarely exercised. 161 This analysis was consistent with
the case-by-case approach proffered by Justice Powell. The dissent, however,
blasted the majority for its disregard of precedent. 162
The controlling law governing this case is crystal clear, but today the Court
blithely discards any concept of stare decisis, trespasses gravely on the
authority of the states, and distorts the concept of proportionality of
punishment by tearing it from its moorings in capital cases. 16 3
The dissenters were outraged that the majority would apply the analytical test
that the Rummel Court "categorically rejected" as insufficient. Chief Justice
Burger's scathing dissent initiates an intra-Court confrontation over stare
decisis which reoccurs in Harmelin v. Michigan:
Today, the Court ignores its recent precedent .... Today's conclusion by five
Justices that they are able to say that one offense has less "gravity" than
another is nothing other than a bald substitution of individual subjective moral
values for those of the legislature .... Legislatures are far better equipped
than we are to balance the competing penal and public interests and to draw the
essentially arbitrary lines between appropriate sentences for different
crimes. 164
Finally, Chief Justice Burger reiterated the concern over limits on such
review, warning the Court that "[b]y asserting the power to review sentences
of imprisonment for excessiveness [it] launches into uncharted and unchartable
waters." 165 He made the traditional "floodgates" argument, stating that he
could see "no limiting principle in the Court's holding." 166 Justice Burger, of
159 Id.
160 Id. at 303.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 304-18 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justices White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor
joined Chief Justice Burger's dissent.
163 Id. at 304 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
164 Id. at 314.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 315. Justice Burger sought to illustrate the vulnerability of the decision.
Today [the court] holds that a sentence of life imprisonment, without the possibility of
parole, is excessive punishment for a seventh allegedly "nonviolent" felony. How about
the eighth "nonviolent" felony? The ninth? The twelfth? Suppose one offense was a
simple assault? Or selling liquor to a minor? Or statutory rape? Or price fixing? The
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course, was not alone in his fears and was only echoing the concerns
previously expressed by the Court. The underlying principles of judicial
restraint and legislative deference were the bedrock of Rummel and Davis.
D. Reconciliation of the Three Leading Cases
The Davis majority read Rummel as placing the length of sentences for
terms of years beyond the judicial domain in all but "exceedingly rare"
situations. Davis was not such a situation. 167 Justice Powell, in his
concurrence, discerned the same "rarity" principle, and when he compared the
crimes and sentences in Rummel, he concluded that the disproportionality in
Rummel had been greater. 168 The dissent in Davis, however, which concluded
that the sentence in Rummel was disproportionate, would have given Rummel
only narrow application, limiting it to recidivist sentences. 169
Rummel and Helm followed two distinct analytical approaches for
evaluating proportionality claims. 170 The Rummel analytical approach was
generalized. The plurality emphasized the rarity of successful claims, rejected
specific comparisons of the sentences, and found controlling the states' interest
in punishing recidivists with harsh sentences. In contrast, the Helm analysis
was particularized. The majority strove for objectivity in comparatively
evaluating the crime, the offender, and the sentence. The two analytical
approaches are directly opposed.
The Helm majority distinguished Davis and Rummel on the facts and seized
the opportunity to set forth as the controlling precedent its own analytical
framework within the factual constraints of the two prior cases. 171 First, the
life without parole term in Helm was an order of magnitude more severe than
Davis's forty years. Second, although Rummel was essentially the same case,
the Court in Helm answered that there was a constitutional difference between
the possibility of parole in Rummel and the possibility of executive clemency in
Helm.172 With Davis and Rummel limited to their facts and distinguished, the
Helm majority was now free to apply the objective three-part analysis rejected
in Rummel and to hold Helm's sentence unconstitutional.
permutations are endless and the Court's opinion is bankrupt of realistic guiding
principles.
Id. at 314.
167 Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 373-74 (1982).
168 Id. at 375-81. (Powell, J., concurring).
169 Id. at 381-88. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
17 0 See Allen F. Harris & Sam Wethern, Note, Application of the Proportionality
Doctrine to a Punishment of Imprisonment, 35 MERCERL. REv. 681, 689 (1984).
171 Baker & Baldwin, supra note 45, at 45.
172 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 300 (1983).
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The dissent in Helm implied that the majority had, in effect, overruled
Rummel and Davis. After all, the Helm majority reads like the Rummel dissent.
The author of the Helm majority and the Rummel dissent was the same Justice,
and all but one Justice viewed the two cases as the same. The same text,
history, and precedents Rummel narrowed were broadened in Helm. The
expansion and refinement of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence asked for and
refused in Rummel was offered again and justifiably accepted in Helm. The
reasons for this switch can be explained by comparing the votes in Rummel and
Helm. Although Justice O'Connor replaced Justice Stewart, that change in
Justices cannot explain the expansion of the proportionality doctrine. 173 Justice
Stewart voted with the plurality in Rummel, and Justice O'Connor voted with
the dissent in Helm.174 As one authority noted, "[t]he most significant change
came, not in personnel, but in the vote of one Justice. Justice Blackmun voted
against the proportionality claim in Rummel but voted in favor of the
proportionality claim in Helm.175 All the remaining Justices stayed on the same
side of the issue." 176 Although not the key to explaining Helm, a change in
Justices has proved significant to this issue. The more recent changes in the
173 Baker & Baldwin, supra note 45, at 42.
174 Preliminary evaluations by court-watchers of Justice O'Connor suggest that her
replacement of Justice Stewart would not make the Court more sympathetic to a
proportionality claim. See Robert E. Riggs, Justice O'Connor: A First Tenn Appraisal, 1983
B.Y.U. L. Ray. 1, 11-12, 16, 20; Carl R. Schenker, Jr., "Reading" Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, 31 CATH. U. L. REv. 487, 503 (1982). Justice O'Connor seems more aligned
with the Justices than was Justice Stewart, and, in fact, voted with the Rwnmel plurality in
Davis. See also 7he Supren Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARV. L. REV. 70, 305 (1983) (noting
five-year average voting alignments).
175 Justice Blackmun did not write an opinion in any of the three decisions. Justice
Blackmun's earlier constitutional philosophy, however, has been summarized as
emphasizing "'judicial restraint, an appreciation for the limits of judicial authority and
deference to state and legislative prerogatives.'" David Fuqua, Comment, Justice Harry A.
Blaclknun: The Abortion Decisions, 34 ARK. L. RaV. 276, 276 (1980) (quoting Michael
Poll, Harry A. Blaclanun, V THE JusTIcES OF THE UNrrED STATES SUPREME COURT-THEIR
LIvES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 3, 8 (Leon Friedman ed., 1978)). Justice Blackmun has also
been described as capable of "astonishing judicial leaps," illustrated by his vote to strike the
sentence in Helm and what has been viewed as an overall change in Justice Blackmun's
social vision concerning the Court's role and his personal role within the institution. See
generally Note, The Changing Social Vision of Justice Blaclonun, 96 HARV. L. REV. 717
(1983); Lyle Denniston, Sandra Day O'Connor: First-Term Review, CAL. LAW., Feb. 1983,
at 29 (Justice O'Connor's ascendancy also has pushed Justice Blackmun toward a more
liberal view.).
176 Baker & Baldwin, supra note 45, at 42 (footnote added). The Rwomel division was
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist versus Justices
Brennan, Marshall, Powell, and Stevens. The Helm division was Justices Brennan,




Court, to a more conservative composition, swing the Harmelin v. Michigan
vote in the other direction.
Consequently, under a "last-decided-best-decided theory of stare
decisis,"17 7 Helm became the deciding precedent. It "appear[ed] to have
established some consistency in an otherwise incongruous case law."' 178 The
principles clarified in Helm seemed to be concrete. First, "[s]uccessful
proportionality challenges against sentences of imprisonment-either for life or
for a term of years-are rare, but possible." 179 Second, if that rare occasion
occurred, review of proportionality claims would be based on the objective
comparative factors set forth in Helm. 180 But beyond a life sentence without
possibility of parole for the crimes committed in Helm, the Court left
unanswered the question of "how to discern and apply the rule in Helm." 181
Finally, eight years later, the Court decided Harmelin v. Michigan.182
Once again, a divided Court provided little guidance in a decision that is full of
contradiction and is generally unsettling.
IV. HARMELIN V. MICHIGAN
Ronald Harmelin challenged his sentence on two grounds: its severe length
and its mandatory operation.' 8 3 He asserted that Michigan's mandatory life
177 Baker & Baldwin, supra note 45, at 47.
178 Id. at 48.
179 Id. at 46.
180 Id. See supra text accompanying note 149 (discussing Helm).
181 Id.
182 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
183 Id. at 2684. An interesting point is made in the Brief of Amici Curiae, the
Washington Legal Foundation, et al. in support of the respondent. Amici pointed out that in
the conclusion the petitioner Harmelin requested that the Court "should hold that the
Michigan sentencing statute in this case is unconstitutional." Petitioner's Brief at 47. Yet the
Petitioner framed his arguments in the context of Helm, which struck down the sentence "as
applied" to the petitioner in that case, but not recidivist statutes altogether. Harmelin's
challenge to the mandatory nature implies that he may have wanted to assert the
unconstitutionality of the statute on its face, a clearly difficult task given the acceptance of
mandatory sentencing in this country. Amici framed the question as only whether or not the
imposition of a life sentence without parole in this particular case is a punishment "so
grossly disproportionate" so as to constitute cruel and unsusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment.
The Court treated Harmelin's challenge, like its predecessors, as a "disproportionate as
applied" challenge; "that an otherwise neutral enactment has been 'applied and administered
by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand.'" Baker & Baldwin, supra note
45, at 50 (asserting that a constitutional process, legislative enactment, and judicial
application have reached an unconstitutional result (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 373-74 (1886)). This analysis was illustrated in Runnel, Davis, and Helm. The
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imprisonment with no parole statute was unconstitutional "as applied." In a
five-to-four decision, the Court upheld the sentence. Justice Scalia wrote the
opinion, but the majority concurred in Part IV only. Justice Scalia's Parts I, II,
and M were joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist alone.184 Justices O'Connor and
Souter joined a concurrence authored by Justice Kennedy;185 Justice White
wrote a dissent that Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens joined. 186 Justice
Marshall and Justice Stevens wrote separate dissents. 187 An examination of the
separate opinions is necessary to understand the current status of
proportionality as a constitutional principle. Although narrowed in the most
recent battle among the Supreme Court Justices, Eighth Amendment
proportionality review will remain a constitutional principle-but admittedly a
difficult one on which to succeed.
A. Justice Scalia
Justice Scalia supported his opinion with a detailed examination of the
history behind the original framers' inclusion of the Eighth Amendment in the
Constitution. His main purpose for this excursion was to refute Justice Powell's
contention in Helm that the Eighth Amendment was intended by the framers to
address proportionality in criminal sentencing. By asserting that there is no
requirement of proportionality review outside of the capital sentence context,
Justice Scalia disposed of Harmelin's challenge to the severity of his sentence
without any extended analysis of the crime, the criminal, or the punishment.
Justice Scalia's examination traced the Eighth Amendment's language to its
original roots in English Law, specifically the English Declaration of Rights of
1689.188 The language used in the Eighth Amendment mirrors that within the
English Declaration of Rights. Its meaning is interpreted to be the same in both
documents. 189 Justice Scalia concluded that the Americans who adopted the
Eighth Amendment intended it to be a check on the-ability of the Legislature to
authorize particular "modes" of punishment-such as barbaric or otherwise
argument in those cases was not that the statutes were unconstitutional, but that "as applied"
they were disproportionate. "The issue becomes uniquely factbound by sentence and
offender." Baker & Baldwin, supra note 45, at 51. In Harmelin, the Court answered both
the narrow question of "as applied" proportionality and the implied assertion of broader
unconstitutionality in the negative.
184 The interim edition of The Supreme Court Reporter misnumbered the Parts as I,
III, IV, and V. 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
185 Id. at 2702-09 (Kennedy, j., concurring).
186 Id. at 2709-19 (White, J., dissenting).
187 Id. at 2719 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 2719-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (with
whom Justice Blackmun joined).
188 Id. at 2686-89; see also supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
189 Id. at 2686-87.
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cruel methods of punishment that are not regularly or customarily employed. 190
Also emphasized in Justice Scalia's historical arguments is the fact that the
"notion of 'proportionality' was not a novelty" during that period. 191 Several
states either had incorporated proportionality provisions into their state
constitutions, or had at least considered them. 192 Thus, Justice Scalia found
that "to use the phrase 'cruel and unusual punishment' to describe a
requirement of proportionality would have been an exceedingly vague and
oblique way of saying what Americans were well accustomed to saying more
directly." 193
However accurate Justice Scalia's historical arguments are, they are only
evidence in support of his narrow interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. As
noted in Parts II and III of this Comment, a broader interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment is supported by history as well. 19 4 More importantly, case
precedent dating back over a decade indicates a broader interpretation of Eighth
Amendment protection, including proportionality in criminal sentences. 195
190 Id. at 2691.
191 Id. at 2692.
192 Id. In 1778, for example, the Virginia Legislature narrowly rejected a
comprehensive "Bill for Proportioning Punishments" introduced by Thomas Jefferson.
Proportionality provisions had been included in several state constitutions. See, e.g., PA.
CoNsT'., § 38 (1776) (punishments should be "in general more porportionate to the
crimes"); N.H. BILL OF RIGHTS, pt. 1, art. XVIII (1784) ("all penalties ought to be
proportioned to the nature of the offence"); S.C. CoNsT., art. XL (1778) (same). There is
little doubt that those who framed, proposed, and ratified the Bill of Rights were aware of
such provisions, yet chose not to replicate them. Both the New Hampshire Constitution,
adopted eight years before ratification of the Eighth Amendment, and the Ohio Constitution,
adopted twelve years after, contain, in separate provisions, a prohibition of "cruel and
unusual punishments" ("cruel or unusual," in New Hampshire's case) and a requirement
that "all penalties ought to be proportioned to the nature of the offence." Id. at 2692
(footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
193 Harmelin 111 S. Ct. at 2680.
194 See supra notes 44-61 and accompanying text.
195 See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text. In general, there are many
doctrines in constitutional law based upon broad interpretation of the Constitution. If limited
to its explicit language, many fundamental constitutional rights, such as the right to privacy,
would not exist. Justice Scalia's historical arguments, albeit sound, are not particularly
pershasive on the issue, but attest more to his philosophical bent on constitutional
interpretation. His bold assertion that the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality
"guarantee" is simply contrary to the weight of authority. He carefully used the word
"guarantee," and he later backtracked and conceded that the Eighth Amendment is properly
applied to capital punishment cases. Thus, the entire removal from the judiciary of Eighth
Amendment proportionality review is unlikely.
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1. Issue: Severity of the Sentence
Focusing on the narrow issues raised, Justice Scalia rejected Harmelin's
assertion that his sentence was disproportionate to the crime he committed. He
found, as Chief Justice Rehnquist found in Rummel, Davis, and Helm, that
there are no adequate textual or historical standards to enable judges to
determine whether a particular penalty is disproportionate. Justice Scalia noted
that the criteria used for application of a three-factor test in Helm had been
explicitly rejected in Rummel and stated that Helm was "wrong and should be
overruled." 196 "While there are relatively clear historical guidelines and
accepted practices that enable judges to determine which modes of punishment
are 'cruel and unusual,' proportionality does not lend itself to such
analysis." 197 Justice Scalia reiterated the major criticism of proportionality
review that it is only a substitution of individual subjective moral values for
those of the legislature. 198 Thus, Justice Scalia offered no analysis whatsoever
on the merits of Harmelin's claims, but disposed of this issue based upon his
belief that proportionality review should not be conducted at all outside of the
death penalty context.
2. Issue: Mandatory Nature of Harmelin's Sentence
Justice Scalia separately, in Part IV, addressed the issue of the mandatory
nature of the penalty. He rejected Harmelin's assertion that a sentence is
unconstitutional simply because the judge is required to impose it without any
consideration of mitigating factors, such as the fact that Harmelin had no prior
felony convictions. Harmelin urged the Court to require a sentencing scheme
similar to that required in capital sentencing. According to Justice Scalia,
Harmelin's proposal would require that a sentence of "life in prison without
possibility of parole [be] simply the most severe of a range of available
penalties that the sentencer may impose after hearing evidence in mitigation and
aggravation."1 99
Although conceding that Harmelin's argument that mitigating factors must
be taken into account finds support in the Court's death penalty jurisprudence,
he distinguished that arena based upon the same "bright line" drawn in
196 Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2681 (1991).
197 Id. at 2696. Justice Scalia related his review that the framers deliberately omitted
from the Eighth Amendment explicit language requiring proportionality in criminal
sentences to a lack of an objective standard. Id. at 2697.
198 Id. at 2697.
199 Id. at 2701.
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Rwmel.200 Justice Scalia explicitly rejected this extension of capital sentencing
doctrine. "Severe, mandatory penalties may be cruel, but they are not unusual
in the constitutional sense, having been employed in various forms throughout
our Nation's history." 201 Justice Scalia concluded "that a sentence which is not
otherwise cruel and unusual [does not] become so simply because it is
'mandatory.'" 20 2
In sum, Justice Scalia espoused a narrow interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment and the Supreme Court precedent on this issue. His opinion
argued against any proportionality review of the length of criminal sentences,
focusing on the three major criticisms of such a doctrine: (1) the framers of the
Constitution did not intend for the Eighth Amendment to require
proportionality in the length of criminal sentences because it contains no
express language which states such a requirement; (2) concepts of federalism
restrict the judiciary's power to review legislative action, and thus, designating
criminal sentences is within the discretion of the legislature; (3) even if a
proportionality principle exists, objective standards of review are inadequate
and thus result in imposition of the subjective values of Supreme Court
Justices. 203
Justice Scalia disposed of Helm as wrongly decided and retreated to
Rumel and Davis as the controlling precedents. Justice Scalia's arguments are
valid and find support in the dissent in Helm and the majority opinions in
Rwmel and Davis. Under Justice Scalia's narrow interpretation, however, any
prison sentence, however severe, for any crime, however petty, would be
beyond review under the Eighth Amendment. Only "modes" or methods of
punishment would be reviewable. Consequently, capital punishment-one
mode of punishment-would either be completely barred or left to the
discretion of the legislature. Thus, it is easy to understand why only Justice
Rehnquist, the author of the Rwnmel decision, concurred in the Parts of the
opinion expressing this narrow view.
200 "It is unique in its total irrevocability. It is unique in its rejection of rehabilitation of
the convict as a basic purpose of criminal justice. And it is unique, finally, in its absolute
renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept of humanity." Id. at 2702 (quoting
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring)); see also Rummel
v. Estelle, discussed supra notes 99-120 and accompanying text.
201 Harnelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2701.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 2683-2702.
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B. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence
Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence, began with a recognition that the
Eighth Amendment encompasses a narrow proportionality principle.2°4 Justice
Kennedy admitted that the precise contours of the principle are "unclear," but
concluded that based upon principles established in their prior decisions,
criminal sentences do not have to meet a strict requirement of proportionality
between the crime committed and the sentence imposed in order to comport
with the Eighth Amendment.20 5
1. Issue: The Severe Length of the Sentence
Justice Kennedy focused on the fact that Harmelin had committed a drug
offense to determine whether, on its face, there was any inference of
disproportionality in the severe length of the sentence. He concluded, without
extensive analysis, that there was no constitutional disproportionality. His
opinion relied on the view that drugs relate to crime in at least three ways: "(1)
A drug u~er may commit crime because of drug-induced changes in
physiological functions, cognitive ability, and mood; (2) A drug user may
commit crime in order to obtain money to buy drugs; and (3) A violent crime
may occur as part of the drug business or culture." 206 Justice Kennedy asserted
that illegal drugs are directly linked to crimes of violence.20 7 He noted that
studies on violent crime demonstrate this point. Therefore, according to Justice
Kennedy, the Michigan legislature could reasonably conclude that because of
the link between drugs, violence, crime, and social displacement, the
2 04 Id. at 2702 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy cites the holdings in Helm,
Davis, Rwnmnel, Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584 (1977), and Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
205 Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2705 (Kennedy, I., concurring). Justice Kennedy offered
four "common principles that give content to the uses and limits of proportionality review."
First, citing Rwmel, Justice Kennedy noted that "fixing of prison terms for specific crimes
involves a substantive penological judgment that, as a general matter, is 'properly within the
province of legislatures .... '" Id. Second, "the Eighth Amendment does not mandate
adoption of any one penological theory." Id. at 2704. "Third, marked divergences both in
underlying theories of sentencing and in the length of prescribed prison terms are the
inevitable, often beneficial, result of the federal structure." Id. Finally, "proportionality
review by federal courts should be informed by 'objective factors to the maximum possible
extent.'" Id. (quoting Rwmel, 445 U.S. at 274-75, quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 592
(plurality opinion)).




possession of 650 grams of cocaine warranted the deterrence and retribution of
a life sentence.20 8
In order to provide future courts with more guidance than provided in
Helm and further limit appellate review of sentences, Justice Kennedy made a
significant pronouncement concerning the Helm test. In response to Harmelin's
contention that a comparative analysis is due, and that such analysis reveals a
disproportionality in his sentence, Justice Kennedy stated that "[g]iven the
serious nature of petitioner's crime, no such comparative analysis is
necessary."209 With this "threshold" determination of whether a sentence is
"grossly disproportionate," Justice Kennedy weakened Helm. This "threshold"
disposition eliminates the need to apply the second and third prongs of the
Helm test. This analysis is in direct conflict with Justice Powell's approach in
Helm:
[N]o one factor will be dispositive in a given case. The inherent nature of our
federal system and the need for individualized sentencing decisions result in a
wide range of constitutional sentences. Thus no single criterion can identify
when a sentence is so grossly disproportionate that it violates the Eighth
Amendment. But a combination of objective factors can make such analysis
possible. 2 10
Justice Kennedy, however, asserted that this analysis was consistent with
the principles established in Helm. He noted the above quotation, but concluded
that this quotation did not mean that the converse was not true. Indeed, "one
factor may be sufficient to determine the constitutionality of a particular
sentence."211
This approach completely undermines the goals of Helm: Justice Powell's
attempt to develop a useful objective standard for proportionality review.
Justice Kennedy's analysis accomplished exactly the kind of subjective
judgment criticized by the Helm dissent and Rummel majority. He and four
208 Id.
209 Id. at 2707. Legal analysts noted that the decision in Helm did not provide much
guidance on how to apply the three objective factors beyond that particular offender and his
specific crimes. See Baker & Baldwin, supra note 45, at 46. Justice Kennedy adopted the
views expressed in an amicus curiae brief. Amici urged that "no proportionality analysis
under Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) is required at all, extended or otherwise, for
patently serious offenses involving violence, drugs, and similar crimes, regardless of the
characteristics of the offender (e.g., first offender) .... " Brief for Amici Curiae, The
Washington Legal Foundation et al., at 5. Amici "focus[ed] their Helm analysis on the first
criterion, especially the gravity of the offense prong, which in our view so far outweighs the
other factors as to make this Court's resolution of this case a relatively easy matter." Id.
at7.
210 Helm, 463 U.S. at 291 n.17 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
211 Hamelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2707 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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other Justices substituted their individual subjective moral values in place of an
objective comparative analysis. The analysis ended before it even began.
Notably missing from the Harmelin opinion, when compared to Rwmmel,
Davis, and Helm, is a detailed examination of Harmelin's offense and his
criminal history. Justice Kennedy disposed of Harmelin's claims with less
contextual consideration than the Court had given in the previous Eighth
Amendment proportionality cases.212 This lack of extended analysis is best
understood by noting that Justice Kennedy's focus was more generalized
compared to that applied in Rwmmel. His analysis concentrated on how society
has suffered due to the "pernicious effects of the drug epidemic." 213 Justice
Kennedy undoubtedly believed that the public harm caused by illegal drugs
justified a harsh sentence, and thus context was considered less important.
Therefore, Justice Kennedy concluded that the severity of Harmelin's
crime brought his sentence within the constitutional boundaries established by
the Court's prior decisions. 214
212 See supra notes 76-166 and accompanying text. Justice Kennedy was satisfied that
prosecutorial discretion and the possibility of executive or legislative clemency was a
sufficient safeguard against unjust sentences. He viewed Harmelin's possession of
"undiluted cocaine and several other trappings of a drug trafficker" as indicative of
Harmelin's deserving the maximum penalty. Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2709 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
213 Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2706 (Kennedy, J., concurring). On this point, Justice
Kennedy borrowed a quote from Justice Powell. "'A professional seller of addictive drugs
may inflict greater bodily harm upon members of society than the person who commits a
single assault.'" Id. at 2706 (citing Rnumel, 445 U.S. 370, 296 n.12 (1982) (Powell, J.,
dissenting)). Justice Kennedy also cited statistics on the correlation between crime and
drugs. For example, he noted that "[i]n Detroit, Michigan in 1988, 68 percent of a sample
of male arrestees and 81 percent of a sample of female arrest;.es tested positive for cocaine.
And last year an estimated 60 percent of the homicides in Detroit were drug-related,
primarily cocaine-related." Id. (citing NATIONAL INsTrrurE OF JUSTICE, 1988 DRUG UsE
FORECASTING ANNUAL REPORT 4, 7 (Mar. 1990); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, EPIDEMIOLOGIC TRENDS IN DRUG ABUSE 107 (Dec. 1990)).
214 Justice Kennedy compared Harmelin's sentence with the one in Hutto v. Davis and
found that "a rational basis exists for Michigan to conclude that petitioner's crime is as
serious and violent as the crime of felony murder without specific intent to kill, a crime for
which 'no sentence of imprisonment would be disproportionate.'" Id. (quoting Helm, 463
U.S. at 290 n. 15). Justice Kennedy attempted to establish a standard based upon the breadth
of the leading proportionality cases from Rwnmel to Helm. He noted that Helm "did not
announce a rigid three-part test" and that Rwnmel and Davis did not credit such analysis.
Harmelin, 111 S. Ct. at 2707. He concluded that "[a] better reading of our cases leads to
the conclusion that intra- and inter-jurisdictional analysis are appropriate only in the rare
case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed
leads to an inference of gross disporportionality." Id. But is this really the better reading?
All of the decisions were close cases, and the factual distinctions, both in the crimes and the
characters of the offenders, raise doubt whether together they stand for anything more than
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2. Issue: Mandatory Nature of the Sentence
Justice Kennedy also found that the mandatory nature of the sentence is
constitutionally acceptable, noting the history of mandatory sentencing in this
country. 215 The basis for his opinion is legislative deference. Justice Kennedy
stated that "[i]t is beyond question that the legislature 'has the power to define
criminal punishments without giving the courts any sentencing discretion.' 216
Justice Kennedy, just as Justice Scalia, rejected any notion of expanding the
individualized sentencing rules applied in capital cases. 217
C. Dissent
In his dissent, Justice White refuted Justice Scalia's historical argument and
his assertion that an objective proportionality analysis is impossible.218 He also
pointed out that by discarding the second and third factors set forth in Helm,
Justice Kennedy frustrates any attempt to objectively measure the
proportionality of criminal sentences. 219 All of the dissenters agreed that the
sentence should be overruled applying the Helm text.220
The dissent's view can be best summarized by a quotation from Justice
White: "While Justice Scalia seeks to deliver a swift death sentence to Helm,
Justice Kennedy prefers to eviscerate it, leaving only an empty shell." 221
V. APPLICATION OF HELM TO HARMEL1N
The most disturbing aspect of the Harmelin opinion is the failure of the
Court to completely analyze the disproportionality of the sentence. Justice
Scalia scoffed that it is legislative prerogative under a system of federalism to
that successful proportionality challenges are rare and virtually factbound by sentence and
offender. The only case which attempted to provide a standard of review was Helm.
215 Harmielin, 111 S. Ct. at 2708. Justice Kennedy also noted the arguments for and
against mandatory sentencing. Proponents argue that "broad and unreviewed discretion
exercised by sentencing judges leads to the perception that no clear standards are being
applied, and that the rule of law is imperiled by sentences imposed for no discernible reason
other than the subjective reactions of the sentencing judge." Id. Critics argue, however, that
mandatory sentencing deprives judges of the power to make individual determinations of
culpability and to consider mitigating facts. Id.
216 Id. at 2708 (quoting Chapman v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1919, 1929 (1991)).
217 Id. at 2708-09.
218 Id. at 2710-14 (White, J., dissenting).
219 Id. at 2715.
22 0 Id. at 2719-20.
221 Id. at 2714.
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assign criminal penalties without the interference of the judiciary. And the
concurring Justices disposed of Harmelin's arguments on a "threshold" review,
concluding that on its face the sentence does not appear unconstitutionally
disproportionate.
On the contrary, a sentence of life without parole is "a fact which on its
own is perhaps enough to trigger an extended proportionality analysis."222
When the Helm test is applied to the facts in Harmelin, one inevitably
concludes that the sentence was disproportionately harsh, in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.
A. Helm Factor One: Gravity of the Offense Compared to the Harshness
of the Penalty
Justice Kennedy disposed of Harmelin's challenge with a threshold
evaluation that the sentence was not disproportionate given the gravity of the
offense. It is clear that "drug offenses are serious crimes." 22 3 And no one
would question that those who engage in serious criminal conduct that
contributes to the increase in violence, as drug trafficking surely does, deserve
serious punishment. But, as with other criminal offenses, different offenders
demonstrate different levels of culpability and blameworthiness. For example,
in criminal homicides, "[s]ociety distinguishes between those who acted with
and those who acted without a purpose to destroy life." 224 Distinguishing
culpability serves important purposes. It provides some safeguard against
excessive, disproportionate, or arbitrary punishment and promotes a more just,
individualized treatment of offenders.
222 United States v. McCann, 835 F.2d 1184, 1188 (6th Cir. 1984). McCann, like
Harmelin, involved a challenge to a life sentence that resulted from a drug conviction.
223 Brief of Petitioner at 7, Harmelin (No. 89-7272).
224 Id. at 22; see Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (stating that individualized
sentencing in criminal cases is preferred because definitions of crime generally have not
been thought automatically to dictate what should be the proper penalty); see also Solem v.
Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 293 (1983) ("Most would agree that negligent conduct is less serious
than intentional conduct."). Compare Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (reversing
the death sentence in a felony murder conviction, the Court stressed the petitioner's lack of
intent to kill as determining that he was less culpable than were his accomplices) with Tison
v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156, 158 (1987) (upholding the death sentences in the felony
murder convictions the Court said, "A critical facet of ... culpability ... is the mental
state with which the defendant commits the crime .... [Tihe more purposeful the criminal
conduct .. , the more severely it ought to be punished .... " "[Mlajor participation in the
felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy
the Enmund culpability requirement.").
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If the Court had focused on the facts of Harmelin's offense, it would have
found that Harmelin did not import large quantities of cocaine.225 There was
no evidence presented at trial that he sold any drugs, or that he was a "major
player in any drug enterprise." 226 The prosecution did not charge him with
drug dealing,227 rather merely possession. Harmelin did not lead the lavish
lifestyle associated with the drug trade.228 Nonetheless, the Court's limited
225 Brief of Petitioner at 30, Hanmelin (No. 89-7272).
226 Id. at 30. The presentence report described the petitioner as a large-scale drug
dealer, estimating the value of the cocaine he was carrying between $67,000 and $100,000.
This fact was affirmed in the Respondent's brief. Id. at 5; Brief of Respondent at 3-4,
Harmelin (No. 89-7272). But there was also indication that Harmelin may have been a drug
addict. Brief of Petitioner at 5, Hanmelin (No. 89-7272) (citing LA. presentence report,
p.4). Respondent also submitted that Harmelin had admitted in a news article that he had
been selling cocaine in quantities of up to a gram six months prior to his arrest. In that
article, Harmelin had also stated that he had "agreed as a favor to the supplier to drive the
cocaine to an apartment in Detroit." Brief of Respondent at 3-4 (citing Drug Dealer Fights
'Death in Prison' Tenn, THE DETRorr NEws).
There was no proof offered, however, concerning Harmelin's role in the drug
trafficking hierarchy, and nothing that would dispute the fact that he was a "mule of
transport." The prosecution, as is often the case, made no attempt to prove intent to
distribute because the penalty is the same for possession as well as the more serious (and
more difficult to prove) offense of intent to distribute. Because of the mandatory nature of
the sentence, the contents of the presentencing report were not challenged nor mentioned at
the time of sentencing. Brief of Petitioner at 5, Hanmelin (No. 89-7272). Thus, there is
conflicting evidence concerning Harmelin's role, and naturally his blameworthiness, but the
mandatory nature of the sentence made all of these facts irrelevant.
Cf United States v. McCann, 835 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1984). In McCann, the Sixth
Circuit panel applied the Helm analysis to a Michigan defendant convicted under a federal
drug law, 21 U.S.C. § 848, and sentenced him to life imprisonment without parole. The
panel concluded that the sentence of life without parole was extremely harsh. The
defendant's crime, however, was also harsh. McCann had been involved in a large,
continuing enterprise in drugs and profits. His drug enterprise was extensive and lucrative.
The drug enterprise was responsible for hundreds of kilograms of cocaine importation,
involving several Latin American countries and a substantial number of people. McCann
was not merely a "logistics man," but recruited people and supervised the activities of the
operation. Further, the panel found that there was no significant disparity when comparing
McCann's sentence with others imposed by federal courts in convictions for continuing
criminal enterprise. Finally, the panel noted that the defendant would have received the
same sentence if he had been tried under state jurisdiction in Michigan. "McCann could
have received a mandatory life sentence in Michigan for activities substantially less
blameworthy than the hundreds of kilograms of cocaine he was actually responsible for."
McCann, 835 F.2d at 1190. The Sixth Circuit, thus, upheld the sentence. Id. at 1185.
227 Brief of Petitioner at 5, Harmelin (No. 89-7272).
228 To the contrary, Harmelin's "financial resources were meager," not at all
consistent with the image of a "drug kingpin." Brief of Petitioner at 30, Hamelin (No.89-
7272). Harmelin was unemployed at the time of the offense. "His assets, apart from the
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analysis treated all drug offenders as equal. It failed to distinguish, as do the
federal sentencing guidelines and most state statutes, between offenders whose
possessions imply a major role in a large drug enterprise and offenders with
smaller possessions, which imply a minor role in what may (or may not)
constitute a large drug enterprise, that is, a low-level street dealer or addict. 229
If the Court had looked at Harmelin as an individual, it would have
discovered why it is unfair to treat all offenders the same without consideration
of their individual culpability or potential for rehabilitation. There was no
indication that Harmelin could not be rehabilitated. He was not a repeat
offender. In fact, he had never been arrested for any crime.230
The Court, in essence, affirmed the harshest penalty possible in the state of
Michigan, without giving full consideration to the impact such a harsh sentence
will have on an offender who may conceivably have deserved less.
The Court should have considered the enormous difference between being
sentenced to life without the possibility for parole and being given a lengthy
sentence. A lengthy sentence at least allows a prisoner to retain some hope or
dreams for the future. "[Tihe very fact of having no possibility of release
drugs, consisted of a nine year old Ford automobile" Id. at 5, and "$597.00 in his pocket."
Id. at 3. "He resided at an apartment in Detroit" Id.. The respondent and amici, however,
disputed this characterization and pointed out that Harmelin "retained his attorney for
$15,000," allegedly "paid for by an associate" of his, "according to police investigation."
Brief of Respondent at 2, Harmelin (No. 89-7272).
229 Justice Kennedy noted that Michigan's sentencing scheme establishes graduated
punishments for offenses involving varying amounts of illegal drugs. Harmelin v.
Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2708 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring). However, the
minimum amount required for the life imprisonment without parole is only 650 grams.
Under federal and other states' laws, a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without
parole does not apply unless the amount is substantially higher: Federal law requires
distribution of 150 kilograms of cocaine. Alabama is the only other state with such a harsh
penalty, but the minimum amount required is more than 10 kilograms (along with proof of
"criminal enterprise"). See Brief of Petitioner at 23-25, Harmelin (No. 89-7272). As noted
in the arguments for and against the Michigan 650 Lifer law, to avoid the harsh penalties in
Michigan, drug kingpins use addicts to transport large quantities of cocaine. Addicts, who
need money or drugs to support their addiction are more likely to risk being caught. Id.
230 Brief of Petitioner at 5, Hanmelin (No. 89-7272). The presentence report revealed
that Harmelin had no prior contacts with the criminal justice system Id. (citing J.A.
presentence report, p.1). Harmelin admitted that he was a drug addict. He denied an
addiction to cocaine which was contradicted by the fact that he had four brass cocaine
straws and one cocaine spoon in his pocket, as well as a small amount of cocaine Id. (citing
l.A. presentence report, p.4). The fact that Harmelin was not sentenced as a recidivist is
relevant in weighing the punishment he received. In Runeml, the Court explained that the
state's interest in punishing a recidivist is different than its interest in punishing a first-time
offender. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263,276 (1980).
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transforms an endurable punishment into a life shattered beyond all hope." 23 1
Thus, it is not simply a difference in degree but also in kind. The possibility of
commutation does not lessen the harshness of Harmelin's sentence. Given the
statutory procedures, it is possible to predict generally when parole might be
granted. It is impossible to predict if or when commutation will occur. 23 2
Life imprisonment without parole is a profoundly harsh sentence. It takes
away everything that people hope and dream for in their lives, forever. Such
punishments are reserved for the most vile and vicious cruelties. 23 3 Is such a
harsh punishment really appropriate for a nonvicious person who commits a
drug offense? The answer is simply no.234
Thus, by failing to take into account the facts of this particular offense (as
opposed to the general effect of drug trafficking on the nation) or to consider
Harmelin's history or characteristics as an individual, the Court skirted over
two important considerations in weighing the gravity of the offense against the
harshness of the penalty.23 5 In the prior cases of Rummel, Davis, and Helm, the
Court found relevant the nature of the crimes and history of the individual
defendants. The Court in Harmelin only focused on the abhorrent nature of
drug trafficking and its current status as "'one of the greatest problems
affecting the health and welfare of our population."' 236
231 Brief of Petitioner at 32, Harmelin (No. 89-7272).
232 As noted in Helm, "[tihe possibility of commutation is nothing more than a hope
for 'an ad hoc exercise of clemency.' It is little different from the possibility of executive
clemency that exists in every case in which a defendant challenges his sentence under the
Eighth Amendment." Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983). More importantly, former
Michigan Governor James Blanchard, in office from December 1990-January 1993, only
pardoned one convicted murderer and no drug prisoners. See Brief of Petitioner at 43 n.8,
Hanmelin (No. 89-7272); Michigan Manual, Mich. Legis. Serv. Bureau (1991-92).
Furthermore, the present Governor of Michigan, John Engler, has not pardoned any
convicted criminals. "Given the climate of hysteria over the war on drugs, [it is unlikely]
that an official would risk taking such an action." Brief of Petitioner at 43 n.8, Harmelin
(No. 89-7272).
233 Life imprisonment with no possibility of parole is reserved, in most states, for
either first or second degree murder.
234 Brief of Petitioner at 32-33.
235 As a result, the Court also missed the importance of Harmelin's argument urging
that a more individualized determination be required when imposing a sentence of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
236 Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2705 (1991) (citing Treasury Employees
v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989)).
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B. Helm Factor Two: Comparison of the Sentence to Those for Other
Crimes in Michigan
The second prong of the proportionality analysis in Helm is to compare
sentences for other crimes in the same jurisdiction to evaluate whether more
serious crimes are subject to the same penalty or to less serious penalties. 23 7 A
punishment, otherwise appropriate, may be so disproportionate to the offense
charged as to be cruel and unusual.
The Michigan statute in question imposes a sentence of mandatory life
imprisonment with no possibility of parole for mere possession of 650 grams or
more of a mixture of cocaine. The penalty is applicable to both the first-time
offender and the habitual criminal. Because Michigan has no death penalty,
Harmelin's sentence is the harshest punishment that could be imposed by the
state on any criminal for any crime. The only other crime that evokes the
ultimate punishment in Michigan is first-degree murder, the highest level of
culpability for the taking of a life.2 38 Thus, the state of Michigan has in effect
equated the punishment for a nonviolent offense with that reserved for only
"the most culpable murderers.., so morally depraved[,] ... considered to be
237 Helm v. Solem, 463 U.S. 277, 291 (1983).
238 In general, first-degree murder is defined as deliberate, willful, premeditated, or
intentional killing. It represents the highest level of mental culpability for a criminal
homicide. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.2-.4; CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West
Supp. 1993); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2502 (1983). In Michigan, first-degree murder
requires the following:
The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to
kill the victim, and that the intent to kill was premeditated, and that the killing was
deliberate. Deliberate means that the defendant must have considered the pros and cons
of that design and have measured and chosen his actions. The intent must be formed by
a mind that is free from undue excitement. This excludes acts done on a sudden impulse
without reflection [or as a result of a sudden fight] .... There must be such a lapse of
time as would give the mind time to think about the purpose and intent of the
killing ....
By contrast, for the offense of possession of over 650 grams of cocaine, the
government must only prove that the defendant knowingly possessed over 650 grams of
a substance containing cocaine.




beyond rehabilitation,. . . [and] the most morally reprehensible." 23 9 This act is
an anomaly in criminal law.240
In contrast, second-degree murder, assault with intent to murder, first-
degree criminal sexual conduct, armed robbery, assault with intent to rob while
armed, bank robbery, kidnapping, taking of hostages by penal inmates, and
being a "fourth habitual felon" carry terms of "life or any term of years." 241
The Michigan courts have interpreted the phrase "life or any term of years" to
mean a mandatory minimum of one year and one day imprisonment. 242
Furthermore, Michigan law provides that a "prisoner under sentence for life or
for a term of years, other than a prisoner sentenced for life for murder in the
first degree or sentenced for life or for a minimum term of imprisonment for a
major controlled substance offense," is eligible for parole after ten years. 243
Michigan punishes more serious, violent crimes less severely than a drug
offense and reserves the punishment of life imprisonment without parole for
only one other crime, first-degree murder. This standard of punishment is
sufficient to draw an inference of disproportionality within the Michigan
criminal statutory scheme.
C. Helm Factor Three: Comparison to Punishments for the Same Crime
in Other Jurisdictions
The third prong of the proportionality test set forth in Helm is a
comparison of the sentence imposed for commission of the same crime in other
jurisdictions.
239 Brief of Petitioner at 40, Harmelin (No. 89-7272).
240 In general, the felony murder doctrine is the only criminal offense which can carry
a penalty as serious as that which is typically reserved for intentional killings. A felony
murder charge occurs when an attempt or commission of a felony dangerous to life results
in a death. See LAFAVE & SCOTT supra note 61, § 7.5, at 622-41. Restrictions have been
placed on this controversial doctrine. See SANFORD A. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER,
CRM AL LAW AND ITS POCESsns 517-38 (5th ed. 1989). For example, many states
require that the felony must be one that is dangerous to life. Id. at 517-24. The felony
cannot be one that was inherent to the killing. Id. at 524-31. The victim cannot be a
cofelon. Id. at 531-38.
241 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.317 (West 1991) (second degree murder);
§ 750.83 (assault with intent to murder); § 750.520b (first degree criminal sexual conduct);
§ 750.529 (armed robbery); § 750.89 (assault with intent to rob while armed); § 750.531
(bank robbery); § 750.349 (kidnapping); § 750.349a (taking of hostages by penal inmates);
§ 769.12 (fourth habitual felon) (West Supp. 1993).
242 People v. West, 317 N.W.2d 261, 262 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); People v. Harper,
269 N.W.2d 470, 474-75 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).
243 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 791.234(4) (West Supp. 1993) (known as the "lifer
law").
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Michigan is the only state in the country which mandates a sentence of life
imprisonment with no. possibility of parole for the possession of 650 grams of
cocaine. Only Alabama has a similar mandatory sentence of life imprisonment
with no parole, but that is for the crime of possession of over ten kilograms of
cocaine. 244 In Alabama, Harmelin's crime would have subjected him to a five
year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for the offense of possession
of from 500 grams to one kilogram of cocaine. 245
Eleven states provide a possible sentence of up to life imprisonment for
Harmelin's offense. All of these states, however, provide for parole:
Connecticut after the defendant serves the minimum sentence; Idaho, parole
after ten years; Kansas, parole after fifteen years; Missouri, parole after five
years; Montana, mitigating factors considered at sentencing; Nevada, parole
after serving the minimum term; New York, parole after serving the minimum
term; North Dakota, parole after thirty years less reduction for good time
credits; Oklahoma, sentence can be suspended for first time offenders; Rhode
Island, departure from the minimum sentence allowed for substantial and
compelling reasons; Tennessee, parole after nineteen years; and Texas, parole
after twenty years. 246
A comparison to federal penalties also starkly illustrates the unusual
harshness of the Michigan penalty for possession of the quantity of drugs in
Harmelin's case. Under Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Harmelin's sentence
would barely exceed ten years, including all relevant enhancements. 247 Under
federal law, the only possibility of a mandatory minimum sentence of life
without parole is under the Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statute (often
referred to as the "drug kingpin" statute). 248 In order to convict a person under
2 4 4 ALA. CODE § 13A-12-231(2)(d) (Supp. 1992) (trafficking).
245 Id. at § 13A-12-231(2)(b).
246 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21a-278(a), 54-125 (West Supp. 1993); IDAHO
CODE §§ 37-2732(a)(1)(A), 20-233(a) (1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4127 (1990); Mo.
RIv. STAT. § 195.222 (Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-32-101 to 50-32-405, 45-9-
101 (1990); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.43 (McKinney 1989); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 19-03-1-
23.101, 12.1-32-01 (Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2-401(a)(1) (Supp. 1993);
R.I. GEN. LAws 21-28-4.01(A)(1) (Supp. 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-416 (Supp.
1991); Tax. HEALTH& SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.116 (West 1990).
247 See 21 U.S.C § 841(b)(1)(A)(2) (1988 & Supp. III 1992) (For a first offender who
possessed the same amount of cocaine as Harmelin the maximum penalty would be a term
of not less than five or more than forty years in prison). However, under the "toughened"
Federal Sentencing Guidelines the sentencing court could add on years if it considered
Harmelin "an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of a drug operation" and the fact
that he was carrying a firearm, coupled with the increased sentence resulting from the
organizer provision, would, in the worst-case scenario, have resulted in a maximum
sentence of 97 to 121 months. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION GUIDELINES
MANUAL, 2D1.1 (1990).
248 21 U.S.C. § 848 (Supp. 11989).
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this statute, she must be an organizer, supervisor, or manager of five or more
people; commit a continuing series of violations; and derive substantial
resources from the activities; and the organization must have grossed at least
ten million dollars per year, or alternatively, distributed 150 kilograms of
cocaine. 249
D. Swmnary
The Helm test illustrates, without question, that the Michigan statute as
applied to Harmelin is disproportionate. Harmelin's sentence is as harsh as the
one overruled in Helm and harsher than the sentences sustained in Rummel and
Davis. Harmelin's crime is more serious. But Rummel and Helm were
recidivists with at least three prior felony convictions, and Davis had also been
previously imprisoned. In contrast, Harmelin was a first-time offender. Thus,
the decision in Harmelin does not even appear reasonable within the framework
of the prior proportionality cases.
The dissent also concluded that Harmelin's sentence was disproportionate.
As noted in the next two Parts, the various reasons to reach that conclusion
convinced the Michigan Supreme Court to overrule the sentence under its state
constitution.
VI. BEYOND HELM: REASONS WHY HARMELIN
WAs WRONGLY DECIDED
Beyond the fact that the Supreme Court failed to apply the Helm test, there
are other strong reasons to conclude that Harmelin was wrongly decided.
A. Public Pressure Resulted in Poorly Reasoned Law
There is a huge amount of public pressure on politicians to solve the drug
problem. In Michigan, that public pressure coupled with an increase in drug-
related crime and frustration of law enforcement officials resulted in the 650
Lifer law.25 0 Not surprisingly, the 650 Lifer law has proven to be a law which
249 Id.
250 Proponents of the bill argued that "the state had failed to stem drug traffic because
the penalties for drug dealing were not severe enough and law enforcement tools were
inadequate." Brief of Petitioner at 9, Harnelin (No. 89-7272). In addition, they "argued
that the law would have an important deterrent effect on drug trafficking [and] keeping drug
dealers off the streets longer would help reduce illicit drug activity." Id. at 9. Moreover,
proponents argued that "Michigan's pre-1978 penalties of up to 20 years in prison posed
little or no deterrent to would-be violaters, with lenient probation and parole policies




draws criticism within the judiciary as well. One Michigan trial judge, Judge
Lippitt of the Oakland County Circuit Court, stated:
Having carefully considered this statute, I have come to the conclusion that this
law is the product of emotion, not reason. Politicians, known as legislators, in
an effort to respond to community pressure and frustration over a very serious
drug problem, rushed to a simple formula, in search of a solution-essentially
throwing away the key for life for any and all individuals who shall possess
more than 650 grams of cocaine. However mindlessly throwing away the key
will neither deter such crime, nor promote justice. Quite the opposite, bad
laws, such as the one at issue here, promote disrespect .... 251
More importantly, there is no evidence that the harsh penalty has worked to
stem the increase in drug trafficking or to deter potential dealers in the state of
Michigan. 252 This lack of evidence is not at all surprising because the
[miajor drug dealers, the intended targets of the legislation, would use addicts to
transport large quantities of drugs rather than take the risk of facing long mandatory
prison sentences themselves. If this happened, the drug traffic would continue and only
addicts, who were already victims of the drug scene, would be faced with long prison
sentences. Opponents "further argued that severe mandatory sentences were a simplistic
approach to the complex problem of illicit drug activity.
Id. at 9-10. They pointed to the large size of the state's addict population and the potential
for profit from drug trafficking as two factors that would ensure there are new drug dealers
to replace the jailed ones, while "the problems which provoke and foster drug addiction
remain unaddressed." Id. at app. 14. Furthermore, opponents pointed out that there is "no
real evidence that severe penalties would serve as a deterrent to crime." Id. at 10.
Opponents also asserted that a deterrent effect could be better achieved "if the state could
ensure certainty of apprehension as well as certainty of punishment." Id. at app. 14.
"Lastly, the bill could put an intolerable burden on the state's courts and penal institutions."
Id. at 10 (citing the House Legislative Analysis March 23, 1977).
251 Id. at 11 (quoting People v. Martin, No. 86-74706 (Oakland County Cir. Ct.
1987)).
252 The 650 Lifer law has been in effect since 1978. Yet, in its brief, the Respondent
conceded that
[tioday, the situation appears to be even worse. . . . In urban areas such as
Detroit... the pathologies related to drug abuse-violent crimes and property crimes,
AIDS, crack babies-are most pronounced. Urban murders, many of them drug-
related, are likely to reach record numbers this year. In Michigan, an estimated 67,000
persons-7.3 of every 1,000 state residents-use cocaine at least once a week.
Brief of Respondent at 19-20, Harmelin (No. 89-7272).
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conditions which contribute to drug abuse and the profitability of drug
trafficking were not addressed by the statute.25 3
Unfortunately, the United States Supreme Court, just as the Michigan
Legislature, listened more closely to the public outcry against drug-related
crime and human suffering, rather than evaluating whether the logic and reason
behind the sentence as applied to Harmelin was sound. The Respondent and
Amici 25 4 presented persuasive arguments concerning the collateral effects of
drug trafficking. Respondent referred to the "crack-exposed 5-year-olds" 25 5
who started kindergarten suffering from an "array of neurological, emotional
and learning problems." 25 6 Amici presented an even more heart-wrenching
description of the sufferings of "crack babies." 25 7 Finally, Amici noted the
public demand for harsher penalties to stem the tide of illegal drugs. "Mhirty-
253 The legislative history of the 650 Lifer law reveals that the Department of Public
Health did not support the bill as passed. The Office of Substance Abuse Services, within
the Department, "believes that the imposition of drastically increased penalties against drug
traffickers must be accompanied by serious consideration of expanded treatment and
rehabilitation to assure adequate care for addicted persons." Brief of Petitioner at app. 16,
Harnelin (No. 89-7272). Other arguments advanced against the bill included assertions that
"the strict law enforcement approach to drugs.., is not only a futile method, but one that
ultimately worsens the problem. When one major heroin channel is broken and the supply
decreases, the price of heroine increases proportionately, and profitability soars." Id. at app.
14.
2 54 The United States Government, National District Attorneys Association,
Washington Legal Foundation, Citizens for Law and Order, Families and Friends of
Missing Persons and Violent Crime Victims, Maryland Coalition Against Crime, Parents
Association to Neutralize Drug and Alcohol Abuse, and the Stephanie Roper Committee,
Inc.
255 Brief of Respondent at 20, Hamelin (No. 89-7272).25 6 Id.
257 Id.
"[Cirack babies" suffer from a number of birth defects, including deformations such as
missing extremities (usually fingers), deformed sex organs and prune belly syndrome.
A very high number of cocaine-addicted infants also suffer from abnormally low birth
weight (the leading cause of infant mortality), meconium aspiration (a fetus's ingestion
of its own bodily wastes), and repeated seizures. In addition to numerous cases of
permanent and severe brain damage, most crack babies typically suffer from small head
circumference, restricting the space in which the brain may normally develop .... [A]
large number of these children die. Many of those that do survive will live out their
lives severely handicapped as a result of their mothers' use of cocaine.




eight percent of the public believes that convicted drug dealers not guilty of a
specific murder should be subject to the death penalty." 25 8
However, instead of adding up to a compelling argument for affirming the
tough mandatory life sentence, this evidence more convincingly illustrates that
the source of the Supreme Court's decision was probably not sound
constitutional analysis nor careful consideration of the constitutionally
guaranteed rights under the Eighth Amendment. Rather, the Court weighed the
public's justified fear of drug crime against an individual's rights to a sentence
rationally supported by modem objectives of criminal punishment and decided
that the latter was less important than the former. In weighing individual
constitutionally guaranteed rights, however, the Supreme Court should,
generally, give more deference to the right afforded to the individual rather
than to society's concerns. History has proven that society often reacts
irrationally to both real and perceived threats. 25 9
B. First-Time Offenders Punished Unduly Harshly
Harmelin, a first-time offender, was by statutory mandate, sentenced to the
harshest penalty possible in the state of Michigan. The trial judge could not
evaluate Harmelin as an individual, or judge and examine any positive
accomplishments in his life. The trial judge was also unable to take into
consideration the circumstances of the crime, including the lack of evidence as
to any violent behavior by Harmelin, or the possibility that Harmelin could be
rehabilitated. 260 A law that was designed to target drug kingpins has resulted in
258 Brief of Amici Curiae, The Washington Legal Foundation et al., at 13. Amici
noted:
The scourge of illegal narcotics has turned America's major cities into a free-fire zone.
Drug dealers' wars, fought with AK-47s, Uzis, 9mm Berettas, and the .38 caliber
revolvers like the one that [Harmelin] carried, cause thousands of homicides each
year .... The number of persons believing that drug abuse is the most serious
problem our nation faces has grown from two percent in 1985 to twenty-seven percent
in 1989.
Id. at 11, 13-14.
259 This country's history attests to this very fact. The "Great Red Scare" of the 1920s
and the prosecution of communists under the Smith Act during the post-World War II Cold
War era most notably come to mind. The general fear of communism which gripped this
nation led to the persecution of individuals for certain types of speech and associations with
communists, both of which arguably should have been protected by the First Amendment.
See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357
(1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616
(1919).
260 Brief of Petitioner at 5, Harmelin (No. 89-7272).
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the conviction and harsh sentencing of low-level, first-time offenders. "[Tihe
majority of the 650 Lifers are first-time offenders," 261 approximately 130
overall, with "[m]ore than fifty percent [acting as] mere accessories-lookouts,
drivers, couriers." 262 Thus, the law's stated purpose has not been achieved.
The Supreme Court should have more thoroughly considered the real
consequences of this statute. Mandatory life imprisonment without parole is
second only to the death penalty in its complete and permanent deprivation of
fundamental liberties. In his dissent in Harmelin, Justice Stevens pointed out
that
a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole
does share one important characteristic of a death sentence: The offender will
never regain his freedom. Because such a sentence does not even purport to
serve a rehabilitative function, the sentence must rest on a rational
determination that the punished 'criminal conduct is so atrocious that society's
interest in deterrence and retribution wholly outweighs any considerations of
reform or rehabilitation of the perpetrator.'... No jurisdiction except
Michigan has concluded that [a first-time drug] offense belongs in a category
where reform and rehabilitation are considered totally unattainable.263
Mandatory life sentences have created appalling conditions in prisons
today. Prisons are overcrowded and plagued by the spread of diseases and
inadequate health care for the prison population.264 Prisons are marred by
2611d.
262 Sager, supra note 11, at 82.
263 Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2719, 2720 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 307 (1972) (Stewart, J.,
concurring)).
264 See Sandra G. Boodman, Prison Medical Crisis: Overcrowadng Created by the War
on Drugs Poses a Public Health Emergency, WASH. POST, July 7, 1992, at Z5 ("The war
on drugs has led to an unprecedented growth in the nation's prison population, straining
medical services in many -institutions, which are being swamped by inmates with
tuberculosis and other life-threatening diseases."). The article further reported that multiple
"inmates are routinely confined to cells built to accomodate one person[, which] makes
prisons ideal breeding grounds for potentially lethal diseases such as AIDS .... " Id; see
also Dennis Cauchon, "Lock'em up" Policy Under Attack- Drug Arrests Put Prisons in a
Pinch, U.S.A. TODAY, Sept. 1, 1992, at 4a ("Since [1980], the nation's prison and jail
population has grown from 513,809 to 1,248,011 in 1991. Experts say the growth will
continue in the 1990s because of the drug war, long mandatory drug sentences and cutbacks
in parole .... Drug arrests grew from 471,165 in 1980 to 1,089,500 in 1991."); Jonathan
Marshall, How Our War on Drugs Shattered the Cities, WASH. POST, May 17, 1992, at C1
("The number of Americans behind bars exploded more than 130 percent between 1980
and 1990 .... The billions spent to target drug offenders explain much of this dizzy
growth." At the state level, "mandatory sentencing laws [have] clogged prisons with drug
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violence, and mandatory sentencing laws have prevented the utilization of
alternative programs. 265
Thus, the conditions of prisons today make a mandatory life sentence
extremely cruel when meted out without careful consideration. To condemn a
person to live out the rest of his or her life in such conditions without
consideration for the individual's history, the culpability in the offense, and the
propensity for future criminal activity violates modem standards of decency.
Furthermore, lifetime incarceration of individuals who probably can be
rehabilitated only further burdens an already overwhelmed prison system.
Individuals who have committed far more violent and horrendous crimes get
released to make room for those convicted of nonviolent drug offenses.266
Michigan's statute has resulted in numerous first-time offenders, who are in
some cases very young, being totally deprived of any chance of ever living a
productive life.267 For example, there is the case of Gary Wayne Fannon, an
eighteen-year-old first-time offender, also convicted under this same Michigan
law.268
Gary Wayne Fannon was eighteen years old when he was sentenced to
serve a life term of imprisonment under the Michigan 650 Lifer law. Barely out
of high school, Fannon was targeted for an undercover "sting" operation after
users and peddlers.... For some minorities, these trends have had a truly devastating
impact.").
265 Jay Romano, The Struggle to Ease Jail Overcrowding, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1992,
§ 13N1, at 1 ("Mo relieve the overcrowding, correction officials are looking to such
sentencing alternatives as weekends in prison, and community service, and to work-release
and home-confinement programs for inmates.").
266 "New Attorney General Janet Reno questions the wisdom of the federal policy of
locking up a drug addict for a mandatory five to ten years in prison, while a violent criminal
gets off because of lack of space." Reno Urges Treatment for Ofnders, THE CINCINNATI
ENQUIRER, May 10, 1993, at A7; see also Bruce Frankel and Dennis Cauchon, Judicial
Revolt Over Sentencing Picks up Steam, U.S.A. TODAY, May 3, 1993, at 9 (explaining that
a growing number of federal judges refuse to impose the harsh drug sentences); Steve
Gerstel, Drug Use Parallels Creation of Marginal Americans, UPI, Mar. 24, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI file. (Charles Rangel, D-N.Y., Chairman of the
Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, criticized law enforcement efforts to
stem the tide of illegal drug use. "[O]ur response has been to fill our prisons with nonviolent
offenders [under mandatory sentences]-who, in many instances, need treatment, education
and rehabilitation more than prison bars. Their presence deprives us the use of existing cells
to house more dangerous and violent criminals.").
267 In the case that the Michigan Supreme Court reversed the sentences for mere
possession, the defendent, Ruth Bullock, was a first-time offender. Her only prior
convictions were three misdemeanors in 1960. People v. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d 866, 867
(Mich. 1992).
268 People v. Fannon, 491 N.W.2d 817 (Mich. 1992).
[Vol. 54:12051250
EIGHTHAMENDMENTPROPORTIONALITYREVIEW
a shooting incident resulted in the arrest of a policeman's son.269 The officer's
son introduced Fannon to a "friend" who wanted to buy some marijuana.
Fannon sold it to him. Later the friend wanted to buy a gram of cocaine.
Fannon told him he really didn't deal in coke[, but] he'd see what he could
do." 270 Fannon later sold him the cocaine. After selling the cocaine for weeks,
Fannon himself became a regular user.271 Finally, his new friend said he
wanted to buy a kilogram of cocaine. Fannon claims he was getting scared
about this time, and had decided to go off to Florida with his girlfriend to visit
his grandmother, but before he left he had arranged for a middleman to make a
sale to the friend-an undercover police officer.272
Fannon was later arrested in Florida and subsequently convicted of
"conspiracy to deliver" more than 650 grams of cocaine. The sentencing judge
informed him of his sentence:
I have a stack of letters received from your family members. There must be 25
letters here. They are all glowing as to you and how good a person that you are
and what a nice family you have. The court believes all these things. [But] this
court has no discretion to give you any leniency. The legislators have
determined that the seriousness of this charge, if there is a conviction,
mandates life imprisonment .... [I]t is the sentence of this court that you be
committed to the State Department of Corrections for a period of your natural
life.2 73
Fannon sobbed and his thirty-six-year-old mother fainted as the marshal
took him away.274 He turned recently twenty-five years old, but still has no
idea if he will ever be released. He admitted he made a mistake, but cannot
understand why he had to forfeit the rest of his life for it.
The punishment should fit the crime .... I was headed in the wrong direction.
But now I got the idea: don't sell drugs. Don't do drugs. Don't be
stupid .... But this, I mean... people don't get it when they hear "life
without parole." I'm here until I die.
It's kind of like overkill, you know?275
Fannon remains in prison, his appeals have all been denied.276
269 Sager, supra note 11, at 27, 30, 82.
270 Id. at 30.
271 Fannon claims to have tried it with the undercover officer, which the undercover
officer denies. Id.272 Id.
273 People v. Fannon, No. 87-0982, slip op. at 10-13 (Recorder's Court, Mich. July
22, 1987).
274 Sager, supra note 11, at 27.
275 Id.
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Unfortunately, Gary Fannon's story is not unique.
Though these laws were enacted to catch major drug kingpins, they have been
used instead to snare many who fit the language and the letter, but not the
intent or the spirit of the statutes. Michigan state representative William R.
Bryant, Jr. stated: "In a sense we knew we were enacting a cruel or unusual
sentence, but it was intended only for kingpins. We knew it would not be fair
to some who could come under its language, but we hoped that the inevitable
discretion of the police and prosecutors would limit its use. Our hope was not
realized. "277
VII. ASSESSING THE CONSEQUENCES
A. Lower Courts' Proportionality Review
Reversing Harmelin's sentence would not have meant declaring the
Michigan statute unconstitutional or opening the floodgates of proportionality
review cases. The Helm decision did not sound a death knell to recidivist
statutes. They still exist today in many states and are constitutionally
enforceable. There has not been a flood of reversals of sentences, as the
dissenters in Helm feared. On the contrary, after Helm, lower federal courts
applied proportionality review narrowly, as Helm urged.278 There has been
only a handful of sentences rendered by state courts overturned as "grossly
disproportionate" under Helm.
So what effect did this further narrowing have on proportionality review?
A brief examination of the lower federal court decisions before and after
Harmelin sheds some light on this question.
276 People v. Fannon, 491 N.W.2d 817 (Mich. 1992).
277 Sager, supra note 11, at 82. The Fannon article mentioned the fact that the
majority of those sentenced to life under this law are first-time offenders whose culpability
under discretionary sentences may have garnered a reduction in sentence. Another example
is Ruth Bullock, a 48-year-old grandmother who had never been convicted of any serious
crime and had held a steady job as an auto worker for 16 years. She picked up someone at
the airport who was carrying more than 650 grams of cocaine and was subsequently
sentenced to life imprisonment. People v. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d 866 (Mich. 1992).
27 8 Justice Powell specifically stated that the Court did not "adopt or imply approval of
a general rule of appellate review of sentences. Absent specific authority, it is not the role of
an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing court." Helm v.
Solem, 463 U.S. 277, 290 n.16 (1983). He further stated that "the appellate court decides
only whether the sentence under review is within constitutional limits. In view of the
substantial deference that must be accorded legislatures and sentencing courts, a reviewing
court rarely will be required to engage in extended analysis to determine that a sentence is




Contrary to the prediction of the dissenters in Helm, there has not been a
flood of proportionality review cases or reversals of criminal sentences.
"Instead, courts have demonstrated that they are 'capable of applying the
Eighth Amendment to disproportionate noncapital sentences with a high degree
of sensitivity to principles of federalism and state autonomy.'" 279 Only four of
the state cases cited in Harmelin were reversed on the basis of the Helm
proportionality analysis. 280 In Cowers v. State281 the Mississippi Supreme
Court held that a trial court had discretion to reduce a mandatory sentence of
fifteen years without parole under a recidivist statute for a defendant who
uttered a forged check.282 Also, in Naovarath v. State,283 the court relied on
both state and federal constitutions to overturn a sentence of life without parole
imposed on an adolescent who killed and then robbed an individual who had
repeatedly molested him.
There have not been any reported federal cases in which a sentence was
overruled as disproportionate based upon Helm. On the contrary, the federal
courts have been interpreting "grossly disproportionate" as a very narrow
category. For example, in Young v. Miller284 the Sixth Circuit upheld a
mandatory life term' under the Michigan 650 Lifer law for a first offender
convicted of possession with intent to deliver more than 650 grams of heroin.
The defendant possessed approximately 1300 grams of heroin. The Sixth
Circuit concluded that because of the severity of her crime (possessing twice
the legal limit), her sentence did not warrant reversal. 285
Thus, the federal courts have not been inclined to reverse sentences based
upon Helm, but have interpreted "grossly disproportionate" as being a difficult
standard to meet under the objective comparative analysis set forth in Helm.
2. After Harmelin
There have not been any reported cases of sentences overturned under
proportionality review since Harmelin, although federal challenges have still
been undertaken. The federal courts have cited Harmelin as the controlling
precedent in disposing of such challenges. "A recent decision by the Supreme
279 Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2713 (1991) (White, J., dissenting)
(quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 306 (1980)).
280 Id. at 2713 n.2 (White, J., dissenting).
281 522 So. 2d 762 (Miss. 1988).
282 See also Ashley v. State, 538 So. 2d 1181 (Miss. 1989).
283 779 P.2d 944 (Nev. 1989).
284 883 F.2d 1276 (6th Cir. 1989).
285 Id.
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Court has settled this issue definitively." 286 Furthermore, the Harmelin
decision has meant that drug cases do not receive extended analysis. They
automatically carry a presumption of proportionality no matter how severe
compared to the offense. Thus, harsh mandatory drug sentences will remain in
force in spite of their drawbacks. They are more likely to be upheld and,
therefore, more likely to be sought by prosecutors.
B. The Michigan Supreme Court Overturns 650 Lifer Sentences
The Michigan Supreme Court recently reversed the sentences of persons
convicted of simple possession under the 650 Lifer law. The court held that the
sentences were disproportionate to the crime under the state constitutional
provision against "cruel or unusual" punishments.287 Although the Michigan
Constitution bears no express proportionality requirement, Michigan cases
interpreted the ban on cruel or unusual punishments to include disproportionate
sentences.
In overruling the sentences for offenders convicted of simple possession,
the court noted that it has "followed an approach more consistent with the
reasoning of the Harmelin dissenters than with that of the Harmelin
majority."288 In fact, the court in People v. Lorentzen had used the three-
pronged test later adopted by the Supreme Court in Helm.289
The Michigan Supreme Court stated: "while Harmelin is binding and
authoritative for purposes of applying the United States Constitution, it is only
persuasive authority for purposes of this court's interpretation of the Michigan
Constitution." 290 Therefore, the court relied on its own precedent and the
reasoning of the dissenting justices in Harmelin291 and applied the
Helm/Lorentzen test. The court acknowledged the gravity of the offense,
however, and it also observed that "conviction of the crime involved here does
not require any proof that the defendant committed, aided, intended, or even
286 United States v. Kramer, 955 F.2d 479, 488 (7th Cir. 1992); see also United States
v. Lowden, 955 F.2d 128 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Torres, 941 F.2d 124 (2d Cir.
1991); United States v. Hopper, 941 F.2d 419 (6th Cir. 1991); Sepulveda v. United States,
787 F. Supp. 24 (D. Puerto Rico 1992).
287 People v. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d 866 (Mich. 1992) (two cases consolidated).
288 Id. at 873. The court cited People v. Lorentzen, 194 N.W.2d 827 (Mich. 1972),
which struck down under the Eighth Amendment and McI. CoNsT. art. 1, § 16 a
mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years in prison for selling any amount of marijuana.
2 89 Bullock, 485 N.W.2d at 873.
2 90 ld. at 870.
291 Id. The court disregarded the divided decision in favor of its own precedents,
refusing to "reflexively follow the latest turn in the United States Supreme Court's Eighth
Amendment analysis." Id. at 874. "It is unclear, in the wake of Harmelin whether...
Solem's analysis survives as a matter of federal constitutional law .... " Id. at 873.
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contemplated any loss of life or other violent crime .... -292 The court further
concluded that
it would be profoundly unfair to impute full personal responsibility and moral
guilt to defendants for any and all collateral acts, unintended by them, which
might have been later committed by others in connection with the seized
cocaine. Persons who independently commit violent and other crimes in
connection with illegal drugs can and should be held individually responsible
by our criminal justice system.293
Therefore, the Michigan Supreme Court found that the sentence was
unconstitutional as applied to offenders convicted of simple possession.
However, the Michigan Supreme Court's decision reaches only those
convicted for simple possession. Their sentences were reduced to life with
eligibility for parole after ten years. The intent-to-distribute-and-deliver
offenders such as Gary Fannon remain sentenced to life imprisonment with no
parole.294
VIII. CONCLUSION
Modem concepts of penology and evolved standards of decency warrant
the expectation that the punishment should fit the particular offender and the
particular crime.295 Even today, however, punishments exist that should
be barred by the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court must
ultimately determine whether some criminal sentences are so cruel and
unusual that they violate the Constitution. Thus, the Supreme Court must
conduct proportionality review.
The Supreme Court has struggled in this area. It has historically
intervened with caution and shown considerable deference to the states.
But the Court must maintain its proper role.296 When a statute does not
conform to "basic concepts of human dignity or clear constitutional commands,
292 Id. at 876.
293 Id.
294 A dissenting Justice in the Fannon appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court stated
the court should hear arguments on the intent and delivery cases. He further stated that
prosecutors may have charged possession out of convenience because the penalty was the
same, and thus some caught with possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine could be
"charge[d] up" to the harsher penalty if the prosecution argued that such a large quantity
inferred an intent to deliver. People v. Fannon, 491 N.W.2d 817, 821 (Mich. 1992) (Levin,
J., dissenting).
295 Baker & Baldwin, supra note 45, at 73.
296 Id.
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the Court's duty, and not its discretion, is invoked." 297 Furthermore, in
fulfilling its duty, the Court must not haphazardly conduct its analysis; ignoring
important considerations in favor of more politically popular concerns.
The decision in Harmelin v. Michigan has had and will continue to have a
chilling effect on constitutional challenges based upon the Eighth Amendment
proportionality principle. In upholding such a harsh sentence without
consideration of the individual offender, the Court upheld a punishment
obviously devoid of legitimate penological objectives. The Court based its
decision upon the general threat to society drug offenses pose rather than any
actual threat Harmelin posed. Clearly the catalyst behind the decision was the
popular sentiment concerning the harmful impact of illegal drugs on American
society and Americans' loathing of individuals who perpetrate this scourge.
Hence, the Court abdicated its role as the final arbiter of constitutional rights
and set aside the concepts of justice and fairness in favor of the more popular
decision, a decision which affirmed an impingement upon basic civil liberties.
Mitigating the impact is the divisiveness within the Court. The majority
concurred only in the decision and in Part IV of the plurality opinion. The
potential for a more thoughtful United States Supreme Court proportionality
review remains.
Ultimately, the Harmelin decision will more severely limit the United
States Supreme Court's already limited proportionality review to only the most
compelling cases. It is a functionally more narrow definition of proportionality.
Only "grossly disproportionate" sentences-under Harmelin rather than
Helm-will be considered unconstitutional, and the concurring Justices
indicated that such a determination can be in some cases made at the threshold
level, without Helm's complete three-part analysis. In other rare cases, the
analysis established in Helm may be applied. Mandatory life sentences in drug
cases, regardless of the offender's actual blameworthiness, have a
"constitutional stamp of approval."298
Whether the Court hears another case challenging a criminal sentence will
depend on how the federal courts continue to interpret Harmelin. A change in
Justices-forming a pro-Helm majority-and an undeniably compelling case
would present a perfect scenario for restoration of the Helm principles.
However, this scenario is not likely to happen in the next few years. The pro-
Rummel forces have already gained a likely vote with Justice Clarence
Thomas, 299 who replaced the late Justice Thurgood Marshall, a Helm
supporter. Thus, it is likely that the current Court would reach a similar result.
297 Id.
298 Ruth Marcus, High Court Upholds Life Sentence in Drug Case: Mandatory
Michigan Penalty Imposed for Possession of 1 1/2 Pounds of Cocaine, WASH. POST, June
28, 1991, at A16.
299 Justice Thomas has urged narrow interpretation of the Eighth Amendment
protection in other cases. See Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1010 (1992) (Thomas,
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Unfortunately, the present United States Supreme Court has displayed the
tendency to succumb to popular pressures described by Oliver Wendell
Holmes:
Great cases, like hard cases make bad law. For great cases are called great, not
by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because
of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the
feelings and distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of
hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and
before which even well settled principles of law will bend.300
Undoubtedly, future legal analysts will look back at the war on drugs as a time
when Holmes's words were particularly applicable.301
Olivia Outlaw Singletary
J., diksenting) (suggesting that the Court's ruling was a "manifestation of the pervasive view
that the Federal Constitution must address all ills in our society").
300 Northern Secs. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
301 Baum, supra note 1, at 887. While drug cases flood the courts, the Supreme Court
has steadily eroded the constitutional protections against police and legislative excess. For
example,
[tihe court during the past decade let police obtain search warrants on the strength of
anonymous tips (Fourth and Sixth Amendments). It did away with the need for warrants
when police want to search luggage, trash cans, car interiors, bus passengers, fenced
private property and barns (Fourth). It let prosecutors hold drug offenders without bail
(Eighth). It permitted the confiscation of property before a suspect is charged, let alone
convicted (Fifth) .... It allowed the seizure of defense attorneys' legal fees in drug
cases (Sixth).
Id at 889.
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